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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines how new technologies generate privacy challenges for 
both healthcare providers and patients, and how American health privacy laws 
may be interpreted or amended to address these challenges. Given the current 
implementation of Meaningful Use rules for health information technology and the 
Omnibus HIPAA Rule in health care generally, the stage is now set for a distinctive 
law of “health information” to emerge. HIPAA has come of age of late, with more 
aggressive enforcement efforts targeting wayward healthcare providers and 
entities. Nevertheless, more needs to be done to assure that health privacy and all 
the values it is meant to protect are actually vindicated in an era of ever faster and 
more pervasive data transfer and analysis. 
After describing how cloud computing is now used in healthcare, this Article 
examines nascent and emerging cloud applications and big data processing 
methods. Current regulation addresses many of these scenarios, but also leaves 
some important decision points ahead. Business associate agreements between 
cloud service providers and covered entities will need to address new risks. To 
meaningfully consent to new uses of protected health information, patients will 
need access to more sophisticated and granular methods of monitoring data 
collection, analysis, and use. Policymakers should be concerned not only about 
medical records, but also about medical reputations used to deny opportunities. To 
implement these and other recommendations, more funding for technical 
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assistance for health privacy regulators is essential. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporations are increasingly turning to cloud computing solutions 
for storage, communication, and analytical needs. The logic of specialization is 
irresistible for many. Outsource information technology (IT) to a third party, and 
let it worry about security, deduplication, archiving, backup, and other critical 
issues. 
The cloud has its dangers, to be sure—outages may be rarer, but more 
devastating when they do occur, given the centralization of storage and related 
services. This centralization of data also makes cloud providers a target for 
hackers. But the logic of efficiency and specialization is compelling. Just as 
Amazon effectively consolidated the business of thousands of individual book 
retailers into a single platform, some futurists envision a mass migration of 
business records to a small number of cloud service providers. 
Whatever their merits in other areas of business, cloud models have come 
under scrutiny when used in the healthcare arena. Patients are rightly concerned 
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about critical health data being lost or inappropriately accessed.1 On the one 
hand, cloud service providers may reduce those risks by deploying their unique 
expertise. On the other hand, the more entities access data, the more chances 
there are for something to go wrong. Risks along many dimensions—legal, 
reputational, and medical, among others—need to be addressed. 
This Article examines one particular dimension of that risk: dangers to health 
privacy interests caused by inappropriate data access, storage, transmission, or 
analysis. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and 
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH) provide a general framework of federal law to help deter and reduce 
the likelihood that such issues will occur; state laws often reinforce those patient 
protections.2 After years of being dismissed as a toothless tiger, HIPAA has 
come of age of late, with more aggressive enforcement efforts targeting wayward 
healthcare providers, payers, and other covered entities.3 Nevertheless, more 
needs to be done to assure that health privacy and all the values it is meant to 
protect are actually vindicated in an era of cloud computing, given the ever faster 
and more pervasive data transfer and analysis that technological change is now 
bringing to the healthcare sector. 
This Article surveys some important areas in health privacy regulation and 
data protection standards. After describing how cloud computing is now used in 
healthcare, it examines nascent and emerging cloud applications (Part II). 
Current regulation addresses many of these scenarios but also leaves some 
important decision points ahead (Part III). The Article offers some 
recommendations for future policy, reflecting the concerns of diverse U.S. 
stakeholders and lessons from both state law and international policy (Part IV). 
It concludes with some reflections on the clash of cultures between the healthcare 
sector and the Silicon Valley giants now dominating the cloud (Part V). 
 
 1.  GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34120, FEDERAL INFORMATION 
SECURITY AND DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS (2010); Lucas Mearian, ‘Wall of Shame’ 
Exposes 21M Medical Record Breaches, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 7, 2012, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9230028.  
 2.  The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH) is Title VIII of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”), 
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (2009) (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is 
responsible for enforcing the Privacy and Security Rules promulgated under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The Privacy Rule protects the privacy 
of individually identifiable health information, while the Security Rule sets national standards 
for the security of electronic protected health information. HIPAA applies to covered entities 
and business associates, as defined in 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
 3.  See, e.g., Mary Anne Pazanowski, HHS Breaks New Ground with $43 Million 
Penalty for HIPAA Privacy Rule Violation, 20 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 277 (Feb. 24, 2011). 
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I. THE ROLE OF CLOUD COMPUTING IN HEALTHCARE 
A. How Cloud Computing Is Now Used in Healthcare 
Virtually every healthcare provider, health plan, and healthcare 
clearinghouse has used information technology, if only for revenue cycle 
management. The diffusion of electronic health records (EHRs) has now reached 
a critical mass, assuring that more healthcare entities are dealing with digitized 
records of protected health information (PHI). Meaningful use regulations soon 
will also move from “carrot” to “stick,” taking a bite out of Medicare 
reimbursements for eligible healthcare providers who fail to get on the 
digitization bandwagon. 
Traditionally, healthcare providers have invested in desktop computers, 
servers, routers, and storage devices on-site.4 They have also licensed software, 
which is installed on-site. The healthcare provider, as a buyer of hardware and 
software licensee, has had the responsibility to coordinate these systems and to 
optimize their utilization and management. An on-site IT infrastructure can be 
costly and hard to manage, especially in comparison to specialized cloud service 
providers. Healthcare professionals have enough difficulty keeping up with the 
newest medical research and applying it to their care settings; understanding the 
latest trends in IT (even if deciphered and presented by a dedicated IT staff) may 
prove to be a task few are well-qualified for. Further, the increasing emphasis on 
health IT has created a significant dearth of well-qualified health IT staff, placing 
such staff largely outside the grasp of smaller healthcare providers such as 
physician offices. Many healthcare providers, particularly physicians, clinics, 
and stand-alone hospitals, do not want the responsibility of owning and 
managing hardware and software for electronic health records, practice 
management, and revenue cycle management. 
Early steps toward the modern cloud computing paradigm offered another 
alternative.5 The use of browser-based applications and data centers became of 
 
 4. Third party EHR vendors come in many varieties. Attorney Michael J. Daray 
describes two general competing models of EHR vendors. See Michael J. Daray, Negotiating 
Electronic Health Record Technology Agreements, 22 HEALTH LAW, no. 2, 53 (2009). The 
“traditional model” involves a healthcare provider acquiring a license in EHR software from 
a third-party vendor. The software is then installed on the physician’s computer hardware or 
network, and patient data is then stored on the physician’s premises. The advantage to this 
model is that the physician retains control over the data, but cost can be a downside. Id. at 54. 
         5.  See generally Erin McCann, Google cloud gets on board with HIPAA, HEALTHCARE 
IT NEWS (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/google-cloud-gets-board-
hipaa (“Cloud computing in healthcare is poised for explosive growth. By the end of 2013, 
analysts estimated the global market would hit nearly $4 billion, representing more than 21 
percent growth from 2012, according to the findings of a September 2013 Kalorama report. 
In comparison, health IT spending over the year was only projected to increase by nearly 11 
percent.”); Barry Peters & Heather D. Ferrence, HIPAA Compliance In the Cloud: How to 
Enhance Data Security and Compliance Through New Technology, PHARMACEUTICAL 
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particular interest to healthcare providers. As Internet connectivity became more 
pervasive and reliable for many commercial entities, the ability to run 
applications remotely became a reality. The availability of software through 
hosted solutions, such as “Software as a Service” (“SaaS”), allows the investment 
in hardware and hosting services to be made by the vendor, while the healthcare 
provider’s investment is limited to subscription payments. The users do not own 
hardware or software, other than the machines used locally to access the SaaS 
vendor.6 Rather, they are often paying for access to the SaaS programs and/or 
for new computational capabilities, and all the accompanying data processing 
 
COMPLIANCE MONITOR (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.pharmacompliancemonitor.com/hipaa-
compliance-in-the-cloud-how-to-enhance-data-security-and-compliance-through-new-
technology/5355/ (“Many companies are reaping the benefits of cloud computing in R&D, 
clinical trials and research programs. A recent study by the firm MarketsandMarkets found 
that the healthcare cloud computing market, which is only currently about 4 percent of the 
industry, is expected to grow to nearly $5.4 billion by 2017.”); Regina M. Faulkenberry, 
Reviewing and Negotiating Cloud Computing Vendor Contracts, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., 
June 2013, at 125 (reporting that “the cloud computing market in healthcare is estimated to 
grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 20.5% from 2012 to 2017”). 
 6.  Generally, a cloud service provider manages information on behalf of (or regarding) 
another entity. There are several different service models for storing information in the cloud. 
First, the EHR vendor may use the SaaS model discussed above to allow customers to access 
the software on a cloud infrastructure, with the cloud provider responsible for the software. 
See H. Ward Classen, Cloudy with a Chance of Rain: Avoiding Pitfalls in Cloud Computing, 
45 MD. BAR J., Aug 2012, at 18, 20. Second, the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) model allows 
customers to access data held on the cloud through the internet with their own software. Id. 
Third, the Business Process as a Service (BPaaS) model allows customers to access an entire 
business on the cloud, such as billing. Id. In the fourth model, Platform as a Service (PaaS),  
the cloud vendor provides all of the services provided in IAAS, but also provides 
the operating system and storage and network capacity management. . . . 
Essentially, the customer has outsourced to the cloud vendor full data center 
operations, while retaining applications-level responsibilities, including 
maintenance of databases, patch administration, and similar activities. 
Melissa Markey & Margaret Marchak, Chapter 15: Security Considerations in Technology 
Contracting 19 (draft chapter) (on file with authors). Melissa Markey reports that Security as 
a Service (SecaaS) is another model that has been gaining popularity. See Notes from Melissa 
Markey, Esq. (May 2013) (on file with authors). SecaaS, which is a segment of the SaaS 
market, permits customers to outsource security management over the internet, including 
services such as anti-virus and anti-malware. See Introduction to Security as a Service, CLOUD 
SECURITY ALLIANCE, https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/secaas/ (last visited May 20, 
2013); Definition: Security as a Service (SaaS), SEARCHSECURITY, (Aug 26, 2010), 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/Security-as-a-Service. As Markey and 
Marchak point out, the different models involve varying levels of control over software and 
hardware, which affects what contract terms may be appropriate to address responsibility for 
data security: 
[T]he relative degree of control over the environment, both hardware and software, 
vary significantly depending on the service model procured by the customer. In 
IAAS, the cloud vendor has control of the physical environment and hardware, and 
thus should be contractually obligated to implement reasonable security controls 
over related risk areas. Because the customer has control over the operating system 
and applications, the customer must accept greater responsibility for security with 
respect to those elements. The opposite is true, however, for SAAS 
implementations, wherein the cloud provider should be contractually obligated to 
implement reasonable security controls for the entire environment.  
Markey & Marchak, supra note 6, at 20. 
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and assistance that implies.7 Use of SaaS solutions permitted healthcare 
providers to invest in more technology, as the need for capital investment in 
hardware decreased, thus developing richer data sets. As this model matures, 
moving beyond native applications to more collaborative platforms can lead to 
co-creation of value (as in, say, concurrent or shared access by both primary care 
and specialist physicians to a record set). 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has defined 
cloud computing as “a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network 
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, 
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and 
released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”8 If 
cloud computing were merely a form of IT outsourcing, it might not be worthy 
of much legal note. The contractual arrangements and laws of agency 
surrounding such outsourcing processes are well-established. Rather, cloud 
computing services involve new innovations in both technology and business 
models that create new opportunities—and perils—for healthcare providers and 
contractors alike.9 
Moreover, there are unique issues in the healthcare industry that can make 
the implementation of cloud computing more of a challenge.10 As A.K. Soman 
observes, 
The Healthcare industry is however different from most other industry verticals. 
Healthcare data is highly sensitive—any breach of privacy and security in the 
context of healthcare data can have serious consequences. Secondly, there are 
multiple entities that have to deal with healthcare data. This includes care 
providers, hospital administration staff, payers, labs, [and] patients themselves. 
There are extensive regulations governing the healthcare industry and many of 
these regulations impact the nature of the information technology solutions 
adopted by the industry. The fact that cloud based solutions are being reliably 
used in other industry segments does not automatically imply that they can be 
 
 7.  In SaaS, the physician subscribes to the software that is remotely hosted on a server 
and uploads patient data that is stored on that server. Given the use of technology here, 
“concerns aris[e] if the vendor ceases business operations.” Negotiating the Electronic Health 
Record Vendor Contact, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, (Apr. 26, 2012), 
http://www.facs.org/fellows_info/bulletin/negotiatingehr.html. For this reason, the contract 
with the cloud provider must address data back up and provide a clear right to data if the 
contract expires or terminates. See Markey & Marchak, supra note 6, at 34; Notes from 
Melissa Markey, Esq. (May 2013) (on file with authors). Data ownership and limited rights of 
use clauses may also help clarify expectations in such scenarios. 
 8.  NIST Cloud Computing Program, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND 
TECHNOLOGY (Jan. 28, 2014), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/. 
 9.  Delivery models for the cloud infrastructure itself come in four varieties: public, 
private, hybrid, or community. See Classen, supra note 6, at 20-21. 
 10.  Chris Preimesberger, Storing Health Records in the Cloud: Ten Reasons Why It’s a 
Bad Idea, EWEEK (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Data-Storage/Storing-Health-
Records-in-the-Cloud-10-Reasons-Why-Its-a-Bad-Idea-290388/. But note that the key source 
for the story is the founder of a client/server-based health-care record software maker. 
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used in the healthcare industry.11 
Nevertheless, cloud-based practice management software has taken on such 
sensitive issues as patient account management, managing patients, HIPAA 
compliance, patient portals,12 and appointment scheduling.13 Cloud-based 
ePrescription systems may also help providers meet HIPAA’s meaningful use 
requirements.14 Whether the preceding functionalities (of practice management, 
revenue cycle management, or EHRs) are cloud-based or not, a healthcare 
provider might choose to back up its system in the cloud using a web storage 
service—or its contractors may choose to do so. 
Cloud services suffer from certain vulnerabilities. For example, cloud 
services are at the mercy of Internet access. Prolonged Internet outages, such as 
recently experienced during Hurricane Sandy, create real risks that healthcare 
providers will not be able to access critical information when it is most needed.15 
Privacy is also a renewed concern, as breaches of massive databases, even if they 
are less likely to occur than scattered breaches, are far more menacing to privacy 
and security.16 
 
 11.  A.K. SOMAN, CLOUD-BASED SOLUTIONS FOR HEALTHCARE IT, 84 (2011). 
 12.  Such portals can include functionality to “1) Schedule new appointments or modify 
previously scheduled appointments with the care provider; 2) Register or complete any forms 
(including medical history) online . . .; 3) Send messages to physicians or ask questions, 4) 
Request prescription medication refills; 5) Review billing information and make payments 
online; 6) Review further educational information pertaining to their condition.” Id. at 94. 
 13.  Id. at 92. 
 14.  Id. at 95 (“An ePrescription system is a computerized system in which the 
prescription is either entered by the physician/nurse practitioner or generated on the basis of 
data available to the system. The prescription can be automatically communicated to 
pharmacies associated with the healthcare provider.”). 
 15.  Compare discussion in Foley & Lardner LLP, Cloud Computing for Health Care 
Organizations (Oct. 2012.) http://www.foley.com/files/Publication/4e685633-58e2-40d5-
9768-9306a51ec100/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/4780ab11-8d3f-4025-8532-
94da67b03e33/Cloud%20Computing%20for%20Health%20Care%20Organizations.pdf  
(recommending explicitly mapping out the “mission-critical[ity]” of aspects of a cloud service 
before committing to it); with SOMAN, supra note 11, at 75 (“Datacenters are typically located 
in places where the risk of natural disasters (such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, etc.) and 
man-made disasters (such as riots, explosions, etc.) is minimal. They are located in places with 
abundant availability of resources such as water and electricity.”) 
 16.  Designers of cloud computing services are taking this risk into account. See, e.g., 
Siani Pearson, Taking Account of Privacy when Designing Cloud Computing Services § 3.1, 
HPL-2009-54, HP LABORATORIES (Mar 6, 2009), 
http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2009/HPL-2009-54.pdf; AIDAN FINN ET AL., MICROSOFT 
PRIVATE CLOUD COMPUTING (2012); Miranda Mowbray & Siani Pearson, A Client-Based 
Privacy Manager for Cloud Computing, 4 PROC. INT’L ICST CONF. ON COMM. SYS. SOFTWARE 
& MIDDLEWARE 5, § 1 (2009). Some experts note the appeal of “private cloud” computing 
given these concerns. SOMAN, supra note 11, at 77 (“The Private Cloud entails incurring the 
cost disadvantages associated with in-house IT, since you have to put up the entire 
infrastructure for the use of your organization alone. On the other hand the benefit of the 
Private Cloud is the security it offers. The Private Cloud is subject to the policies of the 
organization, just as its operation is under the organization’s control. Therefore, data really 
never ‘leaves’ your premises. This addresses the key concern pertaining to (public) Cloud 
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Cloud systems thus offer a significant number of tradeoffs. In exchange for 
control and ownership, users are offered expertise. Yet it is important not to 
overstate the change here. In many ways the users never really “owned” the 
software they operated—it was licensed. The EHR literature abounds with 
worries and complaints from providers that they were “locked into” a certain 
software system. If they contractually promote platform-independence and data 
portability, some cloud services may help alleviate such concerns. But they also 
raise a whole new set of issues. 
B. Nascent and Future Applications of Cloud Computing 
Both cutting edge providers and informed patients are likely to demand more 
cloud computing services (or at least connectivity and interoperability with them) 
in the future, especially as self-tracking devices proliferate.17 As the possibilities 
of big data analysis inform the development of health information technology, 
the computational prowess of centralized and remote IT providers becomes 
particularly important.18 Several nascent and emerging applications of 
computation in healthcare suggest the intensification of this trend.19 
Over a decade ago, David Eddy was using a computer model, Archimedes, 
to model human drug trials.20 The American Diabetes Association asked him to 
project how well a given drug was likely to work based on extant information in 
his databases and models based on past experiences with similar compounds. 
Now, similar technology can be repurposed to identify optimal treatment 
 
services, namely, control over the data.”).  
 17.  Emily Singer, The Measured Life, MIT TECH. REV. (June 21, 2011), July/Aug. 2011, 
available at http://www.technologyreview.com/featured-story/424390/the-measured-life/ 
(“The new generation of devices rely on inexpensive, low-power wireless transceivers that can 
automatically send data to the wearer’s cell phone or computer. Compared with the limited 
snapshot of health that is captured during an annual visit to the doctor’s office, these tools and 
techniques could reveal the measures of someone’s health in context, and with a much richer 
resolution” (internal quotation marks removed).). 
 18.  See Chris Anderson, The End of Theory, WIRED, (June 23, 2008), 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/magazine/16-07/pb_theory (“This is a world 
where massive amounts of data and applied mathematics replace every other tool that might 
be brought to bear. Out with every theory of human behavior, from linguistics to sociology. 
Forget taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why people do what they do? The 
point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity. With enough 
data, the numbers speak for themselves.”) 
 19.  Of course, one should be wary of overestimating the impact of these trends. See, 
e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Health Care, 13 NEV. L.J. 
722, 723 (2013) (examining “four possible explanations for the difficulties faced by HIT in 
disrupting health care”). 
 20.  Jennifer Kahn, Modeling Human Drug Trials—Without the Humans, WIRED (NOV. 
15, 2009), Dec. 2009, available at 
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2009/11/ff_archimedes/all/ (“In early 2004 . . . the American 
Diabetes Association asked a physician and mathematician named David Eddy to run his 
own . . . trial [on atorvastatin]. He would do it, though, without human test subjects, instead 
using a computer model he had designed called Archimedes.”). 
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approaches to particular cases. For example, there is growing excitement about 
the use of advanced computing systems in clinical decision support. The 
partnership between IBM and Memorial Sloan-Kettering Hospital is one of the 
most noted of these developments.21 By integrating medical records, treatment 
guides, public research, and private insight, “Watson-like” technology may be 
able to assist physicians in assessing treatment options. Given the appeal of new 
technologies to patients, and the increasing difficulty for physicians to maintain 
currency in new developments and consider all of the possible diagnoses for each 
patient, we are likely to see widespread demand for this type of clinical decision 
support in many treatment areas. 
 It will also be tempting for the giants behind public and hybrid cloud 
computing platforms to begin to study the correlations emerging in massive data 
stores. Geoffrey Miller recently commented on the extraordinary divergence in 
the research capacities of academics (who are often hamstrung by IRB 
requirements) and large internet companies (which face no similar hurdles).22 
Researchers have already demonstrated that big data-enabled pharmacovigilance 
might reveal problems sooner than ordinary adverse event reporting systems.23 
 There are many ways that “big data” methods could improve health 
outcomes.24 The more data that is aggregated about a given condition, the better 
researchers and clinicians might be able to trace what interventions have worked 
well and which have not been effective. Moreover, personalization algorithms 
could create ever more customized approaches to care. As Hoffman and 
Podgurski explain, personalization algorithms could allow us to identify, “for a 
given patient, an appropriate reference group (cohort) of similar, previously 
treated patients whose EHRs would be analyzed to choose the optimal treatment 
for the patient at issue.”25 Research has already demonstrated that 
 
 21.  Jonah Comstock, IBM’s Watson Interns at Memorial Sloan Kettering, 
MOBIHEALTHNEWS, (Feb. 11, 2013), http://mobihealthnews.com/20255/ibms-watson-interns-
at-memorial-sloan-kettering/ (“shows how Watson might help an oncologist diagnose and 
treat a cancer patient”). 
 22.  Geoffrey Miller, N=Billions: The Smartphone Revolution in the Behavioral 
Sciences, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY (Mar. 12, 2013), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2013/03/miller (“Smartphones will empower 
behavioral scientists to collect terabytes of ecologically valid data from vast global samples – 
easily, quickly, and remotely. Smartphones can record where people are, what they are doing, 
and what they can see and hear. They can run interactive surveys, tests, and experiments 
through touch screens and Bluetooth peripherals.”). 
 23.  Ryen White et al., Web-scale Pharmacovigilance: Listening to Signals from the 
Crowd, J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N (Jan. 13, 2013), available at 
http://jamia.bmj.com/content/early/2013/02/05/amiajnl-2012-001482.abstract (“The results 
demonstrate that logs of the search activities of populations of computer users can contribute 
to drug safety surveillance.”). 
 24.  Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes Through 
Personalized Comparisons of Treatment Effectiveness Based on Electronic Health Records, 
39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 425 (2011). 
 25.  Id. at 426; see also INST. OF MED., CHALLENGES FOR THE FDA: THE FUTURE OF DRUG 
SAFETY 52 (2007), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11969 (calling 
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pharmacogenetic algorithms can outperform algorithms that consider only 
clinical factors.26 
The President’s Committee Advising on Science & Technology (PCAST) 
has also endorsed aggressive use of health data to ensure new research 
opportunities.27 Many clinical research studies today are “out of date before they 
are even finished,” “burdensome and costly,” and too narrowly focused.28 Given 
advances in surveillance technology, “syndromic surveillance,” “public health 
monitoring,” and “adverse event monitoring” by aggregating observational data 
should be much better developed.29 
An architecture of innovation would also promote better, more flexible ways 
of acquiring, storing, and sharing data.30 As Efthimios Parasidis observes, “EMR 
[Electronic Medial Records] systems now permit advanced data-entry options 
such as ‘free text [entry], templated data entry, dictation, speech recognition, and 
freehand graphic input.’”31 Advanced EHR could improve the doctor-patient 
relationship by opening up new lines of communication.32 EHR systems have 
focused too much on “billable” events and not enough on the types of 
longitudinal and population-level data that could improve outcomes generally. 
Such data would help ensure patients and authorities are truly informed about the 
risks and benefits of drugs.33 A complete record of “demographics, progress 
notes, vital signs, medical history, immunization history, and laboratory and 
radiological reports” can contribute greatly to “evidence-based decision support, 
quality management, and health-outcomes reporting at both the individual and 
population levels.”34 
In the realm of health information technology, Parasidis, Hoffman, and 
Podgurski are among the first legal academics to convincingly merge literatures 
of health system transformation, practical implementation, and legal guidance. 
They suggest the practical feasibility of transforming healthcare generally, and 
post-market pharmaceutical surveillance in particular, into an information 
industry with the types of productivity gains we usually associate only with 
 
for more targeted comparative effectiveness research). 
 26.  Jane Woodcock, M.D., & Lawrence J. Lesko, Ph.D., F.C.P., Pharmacogenetics—
Tailoring Treatment for the Outliers, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 811, 811 (2009). 
 27.  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE HEALTH 
CARE FOR AMERICANS: THE PATH FORWARD 64 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-health-it-report.pdf 
(recommending use of “large datasets” to address numerous issues in clinical research). 
 28.  Id. at 63. 
 29.  Id. at 64. 
 30.  Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the 
Regulation of Medical Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 966-67 (2011). 
 31.  Id. at 965 (citation omitted). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 967-68. 
 34.  Id. at 964. 
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Silicon Valley.35 As Parasidis notes of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s 
(FDA) deployment of “Mini-Sentinel”: 
Rather than creating a centralized database, Mini-Sentinel uses a 
distributed data network that is linked by a coordinating center. The 
Mini-Sentinel data network incorporates [EHR]s from diverse data 
sets that are maintained by public and private stakeholders. Each data 
partner retains control over its own patient-level data and permits 
others to access its aggregated and de-identified medical data.36 
To remedy the deficiencies in America’s system of pharmacovigilance, the 
tactics and methods developed by leading information industries could be 
applied to the assessment of drugs and devices, raising very difficult issues under 
health privacy laws.37 
Digitized health data should enable extraordinary new possibilities for 
medical research.38 For example, Parasidis envisions taking the type of analysis 
in comparisons of personalized treatment effectiveness to a population-wide 
analysis. He convincingly argues that post-approval surveillance will only reach 
its full potential if a wider array of stakeholders begins to take advantage of the 
emerging health data infrastructure to critically evaluate the effects of various 
treatments.39 The free flows of data elevated to constitutional status in the case 
of Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.40 may also eventually improve 
pharmacovigilance.41 But just as Sorrell eviscerated a Vermont patient privacy 
law in order to promote data flows, so future decisions in this area may end up 
 
 35.  See id. at 984-86 (proposing integration of post-market drug surveillance into an 
extant health IT infrastructure); Hoffman & Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes, 
supra note 24, at 425 (proposing the development of a “broadly accessible framework” that 
enables doctors to quickly perform comparisons of treatments); Hoffman & Podgurski, 
Finding A Cure: The Case for Regulation and Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 
22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 151 (2008) (recommending regulations that require doctors to use 
information technology to improve practices). 
 36.  Parasidis, supra note 30, at 971. 
 37.  “Pharmacovigilance is the science and activities relating to the detection, 
assessment, understanding and prevention of adverse effects or any other possible drug-related 
problems.” WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE IMPORTANCE OF PHARMACOVIGILANCE 7 
(2002), available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4893e/s4893e.pdf.  
 38. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 27, at 5 (describing 
potential improvements in care). 
 39.  Id. at 970–74. 
 40.  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 41.  Id. at 2670-72 (holding that drug companies have a constitutional right to access 
certain types of data without undue state interference). For a critical description of the stakes 
of Sorrell, see David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of Patients’ 
Interests, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 74, 81 (2010) (“When people develop relationships with their 
physicians and pharmacists, they are entitled to the assurance that information about their 
medical condition will be used for their benefit and not to place their health at risk or to 
increase their health care costs.”); Frank Pasquale, Privacy as a First Amendment Value, THE 
HEALTH CARE BLOG (Apr. 29, 2011), 
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2011/04/29/rethinking-ims-health-v-sorrell-privacy-as-a-
first-amendment-value/.  
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limiting efforts by policymakers to define and enforce the proper restrictions on 
data flows.42 
Finally, there is the growing pressure from patients to develop control over 
medical records for their own purposes. For example, members of the “quantified 
self” movement can track their pulse, sleep time, weight, mood, and meters 
walked per day, based on smartphone-enabled self-monitoring.43 Isn’t some or 
all of this data (properly summarized or visualized) something that a physician 
or wellness coach would want some access to? Yet providers may not be building 
in the type of “privacy by design” necessary to make this type of data exchange 
safe for all involved in it. 
More modest forms of clinical decision support may also merge with 
marketing. Cash-strapped practices also are liable to want to try to buy in to 
“free” EHR models that are ad-based. Even once HITECH subsidies are 
accounted for, physicians will still often treat their IT spend as a fixed cost to be 
minimized. One of the most successful cloud-based email hosting services, 
Gmail, capitalizes on data analyzed in its records to serve targeted ads. Some 
EHRs are based on this model, and may well be aiming to synthesize multiple 
records (or a whole practice’s records) to sell high-impact advertising 
opportunities to pharmaceutical firms, device makers, or other entities. Given the 
technological flavor of much recent fraud enforcement effort at the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and its various contractors, such data may 
also be very useful for their purposes as well.44 
II. HEALTH PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY IN A CLOUD COMPUTING CONTEXT 
Cloud computing may fuel a convergence of research, treatment, and 
marketing opportunities. But before it can do so, healthcare providers, health 
plans, and other healthcare entities covered by HIPAA (“covered entities” or 
CEs) must be assured that they will be able to abide by longstanding privacy and 
security obligations under HIPAA. This section explores how aspects of HIPAA 
will affect both covered entities’ and patients’ views of cloud computing options. 
 
 42.  Beverly Cohen, Regulating Data Mining Post-Sorrell: Using HIPAA to Restrict 
Marketing Uses of Patients’ Private Medical Information, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 
1148 (2012); Orentlicher, supra note 41, at 74; Michael Heesters, An Assault on the Business 
of Pharmaceutical Data Mining, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 789, 816 (2009).  
 43.  Anita L. Allen, Dredging Up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 52 (2008) (“The lifelog could easily store data pertaining to purely 
biological states derived from continuous self-monitoring of, for example, heart rate, 
respiration, blood sugar, blood pressure, and arousal.”).  
 44.  Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Address at the Stop 
Medicare Fraud Summit (Aug. 26, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/about/speeches/2010/smfsummit.html) (“Under the new law, 
we’re also making it easier for law enforcement officials to see health care claims data from 
around the country in one place, combining all Medicare-paid claims into a single, searchable 
database.”). 
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Part A examines the role of business associate agreements (and regulation of 
business associates (BAs)) in assuring accountability in a networked cloud 
computing environment. Part B explores some of the issues patients are likely to 
raise (and face) as cloud computing becomes more popular. 
A. HIPAA in the Cloud from a Covered Entity’s Perspective 
Among the Omnibus HIPAA Rule provisions most significant for cloud 
computing are those pertaining to liability.45 The final rule makes clear that 
liability extends down the chain well beyond covered entities to reach business 
associates, which include certain subcontractors.46 While the prior HIPAA 
model of enforcement focused on CEs, after the HITECH Act, a business 
associate is regulated directly by HIPAA, making BAs directly liable for civil 
monetary penalties for their violations.47 HIPAA also contains a breach 
notification rule, which binds CEs and BAs.48 As discussed below, a cloud 
 
 45.  The recent Omnibus HIPAA Rule is designed to “strengthen the privacy and security 
protections established under [HIPAA] for individual’s health information maintained in 
electronic health records and other formats.” Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, 
Enforcement, and Breach-Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other 
Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Final 
Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at --]. In addition, the rule intends to “increase 
flexibility for and decrease burden on the regulated entities.” Id. 
 46.  The HIPAA Privacy Rule regulates covered entities’ use and disclosure of protected 
health information. The covered entities regulated by HIPAA include most health plans, 
healthcare providers, and health care clearinghouses. The term “health care provider” is 
defined by the Rule as “a provider of services . . . , a provider of medical or health services . . . 
, and any other person or organization who furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in the 
normal course of business.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013). Under HIPAA, any time a covered 
entity uses or discloses protected health information, the use or disclosure must comply with 
HIPAA’s privacy provisions. The term “use” is broadly defined as “the sharing, employment, 
application, utilization, examination, or analysis” of health information protected by HIPAA. 
Id. “Disclosure” is also broadly defined as “the release, transfer, provision of, access to, or 
divulging in any other manner of information outside the entity holding the information.” Id. 
 47.  42 U.S.C. § 17931 (2010) (“In the case of a business associate that violates any 
security provision . . . [the civil monetary penalties rules] shall apply to the business associate 
with respect to such violation in the same manner such sections apply to a covered entity that 
violates such security provision.”); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.402 (2013). 
 48.  After HITECH, any BA or “third party servicer,” upon discovery of a breach, must 
notify the CE within a reasonable time (not to exceed sixty days). 42 U.S.C. § 17932(b), (d)(1) 
(2010). The CE, then, must notify the patient of the breach within a reasonable time (not to 
exceed sixty days). 42 U.S.C. § 17932(a), (d)(1). Moreover, if the data breach affects more 
than 500 people, the CE also must notify HHS and the media. 42 U.S.C. § 17932(e)(2), (3). 
The responsibilities of the parties with respect to notification should be outlined and described 
in the agreement between the CE and the cloud servicer. Foley & Lardner, supra note 15, at 
13-14 (“Beyond establishing the procedural requirements and timeframes for reporting to the 
customer, the agreement should set forth the procedures and role of the parties with respect to 
investigation of the breach and notification of individuals.”). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400-
414 (2009) (HIPAA Breach Notification Rules). 
608 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:595 
service provider that creates, receives, maintains, or transmits PHI on behalf of 
a covered entity comes within HIPAA’s definition of business associate,49 and 
thus it is important for cloud service providers to understand the magnitude of 
these liability provisions. 
1. Responsibilities of Covered Entities 
Under the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, CEs remain responsible for a host of 
Privacy Rule and Security Rule requirements aimed at safeguarding protected 
health information.50 For example, the Privacy Rule requires a CE, among other 
things, to adopt written privacy policies and procedures; designate a privacy 
official to implement these policies and procedures; and train its workforce with 
respect to these policies.51 The Security Rule requires a CE to “maintain 
reasonable and appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to 
prevent intentional or unintentional use or disclosure of protected health 
information in violation of the Privacy Rule and to limit its incidental use and 
disclosure pursuant to otherwise permitted or required use or disclosure.”52 
Among the Security Rule’s requirements is an obligation for CEs to “[c]onduct 
an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health 
information held by the covered entity . . . .”53 CEs are permitted to disclose PHI 
to a BA “if the covered entity obtains satisfactory assurance that the business 
associate will appropriately safeguard the information,” although they are not 
required, however, to obtain satisfactory assurances from a BA that is a 
subcontractor.54 In the event of a breach of unsecured PHI, a CE is responsible 
for making the notifications to individuals, the media, and the Secretary, as 
applicable, as set forth in Subpart D of the Omnibus HIPAA Rule.55 
If a CE fails to comply with an administrative simplification provision, it is 
directly liable for civil, and in some cases criminal, penalties, as discussed in 
Section 3(A)(iii), below.56 The Omnibus HIPAA Rule eliminated an affirmative 
defense that had allowed a covered entity to avoid a penalty if it “did not know 
and with the exercise of reasonable diligence would not have known of the 
violation (since such violations are now punishable under the lowest tier of 
 
 49.  See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
 50.  Protected health information is defined by the Omnibus HIPAA Rule. Id.   
 51.  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.520 (2013), 164.530(a)(1), (b) (2009); Alden J. Bianchi et al., 
Advisory: The New HIPAA Omnibus Rule & Your Liability, MINTZ LEVIN P.C. (Feb. 15, 2013), 
http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2013/Advisories/2663-0213-NAT-HL/index.html. 
 52.  Bianchi et al., supra note 51; see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-318 (2013) (HIPAA 
Security Rules). 
 53.  45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A); see also Bianchi et al., supra note 51, at 4. 
 54.  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i) (2013). 
 55.  Id.; 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400-414. 
 56.  45 C.F.R. § 160.402(a); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
5589. 
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penalties).” 57 It also eliminated an exception to liability  
for the acts of its agent in cases where the agent is a business associate, 
the relevant contract requirements have been met, the covered entity 
did not know of a pattern or practice of the business associate in 
violation of the contract, and the covered entity did not fail to act as 
required by the Privacy or Security Rule with respect to such 
violations.58  
In addition, a CE “must mitigate, to the extent practicable, any harmful effect it 
learns was caused by use or disclosure of protected health information by its 
workforce or its business associates in violation of its privacy policies and 
procedures or the Privacy Rule.”59 But as long as a violation occurring after 
February 18, 2009 is not due to willful neglect and the CE corrects it within thirty 
days, HHS may not impose a civil monetary penalty on the CE.60 
2. Provisions Allocating Responsibility and Liability to Business 
Associates 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule has long required CEs to have contracts or other 
arrangements with BAs “to ensure that the business associates safeguard 
protected health information, and use and disclose the information only as 
permitted or required by the Privacy Rule.”61 The Security Rule similarly has 
required CEs to “have contracts or other arrangements in place with their 
business associates that provide satisfactory assurances that the business 
associates will appropriately safeguard the electronic protected health 
information they create, receive, maintain, or transmit on behalf of the covered 
entities.”62 Prior to the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, if BAs violated these 
requirements, CEs could seek damages for breach of the business associate 
agreement (BAA), but BAs were not subject to penalties from HHS if they 
violated HIPAA.63 
As required by HITECH, the Omnibus HIPAA Rule makes BAs directly 
liable for compliance with certain of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules.64 
 
 57.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5585; see also James Swann, 
Final HIPAA Enforcement Rule Includes Increased Civil Money Penalty Structure, HEALTH 
IT L. & INDUS. REP. (BNA), 5 HITR Issue No. 03, Jan. 21, 2013, at 7. 
 58.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed Reg. at 5580; see also Swann, supra 
note 57, at 7. 
 59.  Bianchi et al., supra note 51, at 5. 
 60.  See 45 C.F.R. § 160.410(c); Swann, supra note 57, at 7.  
 61.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5567.  
 62.  Id.  
 63.  See Robert Belfort et al., HIPAA Omnibus Rule Reshapes Landscape for Health 
Care Privacy, Security Compliance, HEALTH IT L. & INDUSTRY REP. (BNA), 5 HITR Issue 
No. 04, Jan. 28, 2013, at 20. 
 64.  See 45 C.F.R. § 160.102(b) (2013); see also Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 5566, 5568; see generally Gregory J. Millman, HIPAA Compliance Burden 
Grows with New Rule, WALL ST. J. RISK AND COMPLIANCE J. (Apr. 11, 2013 4:36 PM), 
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A BA will be directly liable, for example, for any uses or disclosures of PHI that 
violate the Privacy Rule or the terms of its BAA.65 BAs also are required to 
provide notification to the CE in the event of a breach of unsecured PHI; to 
comply with the minimum necessary rule; to cooperate with the Secretary during 
complaint investigations and compliance reviews; to provide an accounting of 
disclosures of PHI; and to make an electronic copy of PHI available to an 
individual or CE when an individual requests it.66 
BAs also must comply with all facets of the Security Rule, which Joy Pritts, 
chief privacy officer at the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT, has 
called “the most significant security provision in the massive new Omnibus 
HIPAA Rule.”67 Thus, BAs are responsible for completing a risk analysis and 
complying with HIPAA’s administrative, physical, and technical safeguard 
provisions, among other requirements.68 
The Omnibus HIPAA Rule also revised the definition of BAs to expressly 
include particular entities, including many cloud service providers. First, it 
expressly includes “[a] Health Information Organization, E-prescribing 
Gateway, or other person that provides data transmission services with respect 
to protected health information to a covered entity and that requires access on a 
routine basis to such protected health information.”69 Citing the evolving nature 
of what organizations will qualify as health information organizations, HHS 
declined to define this term, but it indicated its intention to publish additional 
 
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/04/11/hipaa-compliance-burden-grows-with-
new-rule/ (“The Office of Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
estimates that the new rule extends enforcement to up to two million entities whose only 
previous liability may have been private contractual obligations.”). 
 65.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(3) (2013); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 
Fed. Reg. at 5568; Carlos Leyva, HIPAA Omnibus Rule Summary, 
HIPAASURVIVALGUIDE.COM (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.hipaasurvivalguide.com/hipaa-
omnibus-rule.php. 
 66.  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.310(b) (2013), 164.410, 164.502(a)(4)(ii), (b), 164.528 
(2013); Bianchi et al., supra note 51, at 5; Belfort et al., supra note 63, at 20; Leyva, supra 
note 65, at 14-16. BAs are not subject to all Privacy Rule requirements. For example, they are 
not required to provide notice of privacy practices or to designate a privacy official, unless 
required by the applicable BAA. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.520, 164.530(a)(1)(i); Employee 
Benefits & Executive Compensation, Advisory: New HIPAA Omnibus Rule: Issues for 
Employer Plan Sponsors and Group Health Plans, ALSTON & BIRD LLP (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.alston.com/Files/Publication/19c1650b-c278-4abf-9c1b-
9fff28d27c4a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7ed0617b-c6b1-4350-8e38-
a5295c262cd1/13-195-HIPPA-Omnibus-Rule.pdf. 
 67.  Howard Anderson, The Security Highlight of HIPAA Omnibus Shining a Spotlight 
on Business Associates, BANKINFOSECURITY.COM (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/blogs/security-highlight-hipaa-omnibus-p-1431. 
 68.  45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-318 (HIPAA Security Rules); Employee Benefits & 
Executive Compensation, supra note 66, at 3. 
 69.  45 C.F.R. § 160.103; Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5571 
The Rule defines “person” to mean “a natural person, trust or estate, partnership, corporation, 
professional association or corporation, or other entity, public or private.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
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guidance.70 
HHS did, however, provide guidance in the preamble to the Omnibus 
HIPAA Rule as to what it means to have access on a routine basis to PHI. This 
fact-specific determination looks to “the nature of the services provided and the 
extent to which the entity needs access to protected health information to perform 
the service for the covered entity.”71 While mere conduits of PHI do not satisfy 
this requirement, HHS emphasized that the conduit exception is narrow and 
“intended to exclude only those entities providing mere courier services, such as 
the U.S. Postal Service or United Parcel Service and their electronic equivalents, 
such as internet service providers (ISPs), providing mere data transmission 
services.”72 Mere transmission includes “temporary storage of transmitted data 
incident to such transmission.”73 Conduits transport PHI but “[do] not access it 
other than on a random or infrequent basis as necessary to perform the 
transportation service or as required by other law.”74 But an entity that requires 
access to PHI to perform a service for a covered entity—“such as a Health 
Information Organization that manages the exchange of [PHI] through a network 
on behalf of covered entities through the use of record locator services for its 
participants”—is not a mere conduit and instead is a business associate.75 
Entities need not access PHI, however, to be deemed business associates. 
Rather, an entity that maintains, as distinguished from an entity that merely 
transmits, PHI on behalf of a covered entity is a business associate, even if the 
entity does not access the PHI. For example, “a data storage company that has 
access to protected health information (whether digital or hard copy) qualifies as 
a business associate, even if the entity does not view the information or only does 
so on a random or infrequent basis.”76 HHS explained that although conduits and 
entities that maintain PHI both have the opportunity to access PHI, “the 
difference between the two situations is the transient versus persistent nature of 
that opportunity.”77 To reflect this distinction, HHS amended the definition of 
business associate to include creating, receiving, maintaining, or transmitting 
 
 70.  See Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5571. As discussed in 
the text below, while the old rule had no mention of a company that merely stored data, leading 
to much industry confusion, the Omnibus HIPAA Rule states a BA is a person who, on behalf 
of a CE: “creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected health information for a function 
or activity regulated by this subchapter.” Id. at 5688 (emphasis added). HHS makes clear that 
“an entity that maintains protected health information on behalf of a covered entity is a 
business associate and not a conduit, even if the entity does not actually view the protected 
health information.” Id. at 5571. 
 71.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5571. 
 72.  See id. 
 73.  See id. 
 74.  See id. 
 75.  See id. at 5572. 
 76.  See id. 
77.   See id. 
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PHI on behalf of a covered entity.78 
At a recent conference, David Holtzman of HHS’s Office for Civil Rights 
(OCR) indicated that cloud service providers are BAs if among their functions 
performed on behalf of CEs is maintaining PHI, even if the contract does not 
“‘contemplate any access or access only on a random or incidental basis,’” 
because “[t]he test is persistence of custody, not the degree – if any – of 
access.”79 Yet he also reportedly acknowledged a potential qualification to this 
rule related to encryption. According to Holtzman, OCR has not yet determined 
whether HIPAA will bind an entity that maintains encrypted data for a CE but 
does not have the key to access that data.80 It is crucial for OCR to clarify its 
position on this issue given that it is not uncommon for cloud service providers 
to maintain encrypted PHI without the key. 
The Omnibus HIPAA Rule also makes plain that “[a] person that offers a 
personal health record to one or more individuals on behalf of a covered entity” 
also is a business associate for purposes of HIPAA obligations and liability.81 
Not all personal health record vendors are business associates, however, and 
HHS expects to issue future guidance on this issue.82 Whether a vendor offers 
 
 78.  See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103; Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
5572 (emphasis added).   
 79.  Kendra Casey Plank, Cloud Providers Often Are Business Associates Under HIPAA, 
Officials Say, 22 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 858 (June 6, 2013) (quoting David Holtzman, Office 
for Civil Rights, HHS at “Safeguarding Health Information: Building Assurance Through 
HIPAA Security,” a conference sponsored by OCR and the National Institute for Standards 
and Technology on May 21-22, 2013). 
 80.  See id. Compare Kim Stanger, Avoiding Business Associate Agreements, HOLLAND 
& HART HEALTH L. BLOG (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.hhhealthlawblog.com/2013/11/avoiding-business-associate-agreements.html 
(“Unless and until we receive contrary guidance from HHS, there is a fairly strong argument 
that business associate requirements do not and should not apply to entities that maintain 
encrypted PHI if the entity does not have the encryption key. HHS's breach notification rule 
assumes that encrypted data is secure. (See OCR Guidance at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/brguidance.html
). Accordingly, it would be consistent to assume that maintenance of encrypted data without 
the key should not trigger business associate obligations.”), with FAQ: HIPAA and “Cloud 
Computing” (v1.0), CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., 4, (Aug. 7, 2013), 
https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/FAQ-HIPAAandCloud.pdf (“A CSP that has no capability to 
access PHI, that provides storage functionality only, and that adheres to HHS standards with 
respect to encryption should have little liability risk as a business associate (except to ensure 
that it properly manages encryption). Such an encrypted CSP should be able to enter into 
relatively simple BAAs compared to CSPs that maintain unencrypted PHI.”) (footnote 
omitted). The chief health IT counsel for Verizon reportedly acknowledged at a March 2014 
conference that Verizon enters business associate agreements even when its services fall into 
the grey area where the cloud service provider is storing and managing encrypted data but 
does not have “the cryptologic key to unlock the data.” See Kendra Casey Plank, Attorneys 
Say Business Associate Agreements Useful Even When HIPAA Obligation Not Clear, 6 
HEALTH I.T. REP. (BNA) 4 (Mar. 10, 2014). 
 81.  45 C.F.R. § 160.103; Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5571. 
 82.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5572. 
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personal health records on behalf of a covered entity is a fact-sensitive inquiry.83 
HHS opined that it is insufficient for a vendor and covered entity to enter “an 
interoperability relationship” by, for example, establishing the electronic means 
(i.e., an interface) for a covered entity’s electronic health record to send PHI to 
the vendor.84 Even where an individual has given written authorization to share 
data, and the covered entity and vendor have agreed on details regarding data 
sharing, such as technical specifications for the exchange of data and the need 
for confidentiality, the vendor is not necessarily offering the record on behalf of 
the covered entity.85 But a vendor hired by and given access to PHI by a covered 
entity to permit the vendor “to provide and manage a personal health record 
service” for the covered entity’s patients or enrollees is a business associate.86 
Where a vendor offers personal health records both directly to individuals and 
on behalf of covered entities, the vendor is deemed a business associate only in 
the latter capacity.87 HHS explained that the conduit exception does not apply to 
a vendor offering a personal health record to an individual on behalf of a covered 
entity because such a vendor is maintaining PHI and not serving as a mere 
conduit.88 Consistent with HHS’ treatment of data storage companies, such a 
vendor is a business associate if it has the ability to access PHI, even if it does 
not exercise this ability.89 
The Omnibus HIPAA Rule also defines business associates to include “a 
subcontractor that creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected health 
information on behalf of the business associate.”90 Subcontractor, in turn, 
“means a person to whom a business associate delegates a function, activity, or 
service, other than in the capacity of a member of the workforce91 of such 
business associate.”92 HHS explains that the function, activity, or service 
delegated to the subcontractor is one the business associate agreed to perform for 
a covered entity or another business associate.93 
Determining if a subcontractor is acting on behalf of a business associate is 
the same analysis that applies to whether a business associate is acting on behalf 
of a covered entity.94 For example, if a business associate third party 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
 91.  “Workforce means employees, volunteers, trainees, and other persons whose 
conduct, in the performance of work for a covered entity or business associate, is under the 
direct control of such covered entity or business associate, whether or not they are paid by the 
covered entity or business associate.” Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5573. 
 94.  Id. at 5572. 
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administrator hires a company to perform document and media shredding and 
disposal of PHI, this shredding company would be directly responsible for 
complying with applicable HIPAA Security and Privacy Rules.95 Similarly, a 
subcontractor hired to support a business associate with personal health record 
functions is a business associate and thus required to comply with HIPAA’s 
breach notification rule:96 
This subcontractor revision aims to prevent covered entities and business 
associates from avoiding liability for HIPAA privacy and security violations by 
subcontracting functions.97  
[D]ownstream entities that work at the direction of or on behalf of a 
business associate and handle protected health information would also 
be required to comply with the applicable Privacy and Security Rule 
provisions in the same manner as the primary business associate, and 
likewise would incur liability for acts of noncompliance.98  
Thus, just as CEs must obtain satisfactory assurances from their BAs, 
business associates must do the same with regard to subcontractors 
[that satisfy the Omnibus HIPAA Rule’s definition], and so on, no 
matter how far “down the chain” the information flows. This ensures 
that individuals’ health information remains protected by all parties 
that create, receive, maintain, or transmit the information in order for 
a covered entity to perform its healthcare functions.99 
Carlos Leyva, an Internet attorney and frequent contributor to 
hipaasurvivalguide.com, has flagged the “‘downstream impact’ of this 
modification” as very significant.100 
Importantly, covered entities are not required to contract directly with 
subcontractors to establish a chain of liability.101 Instead, business associates are 
responsible for obtaining satisfactory assurances in the form of a written contract 
or other arrangement that a subcontractor will appropriately safeguard PHI.102 
But HHS intended liability to attach to a subcontractor, even if the business 
associate failed to enter a business associate contract with the subcontractor, as 
long as the party is an agent of, or other person acting on behalf of, the business 
 
 95.  Id. at 5573. But if a business associate hires a subcontractor to shred documents that 
do not contain PHI, then the subcontractor is not a business associate. See id. at 5574.  
 96.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5572. HHS emphasized that 
despite extending the definition of business associate to include subcontractors, financial 
institutions that are performing payment processing activities under Section 1179 of HIPAA 
continue to be excluded from the definition of business associates. See id.  
 97.  Id. at 5572-73. 
 98.  Id. at 5573. 
 99.  Id. at 5574. 
 100.  Leyva, supra note 65. 
 101.  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.308(b)(1), 164.502(e)(e)(i) (2013); Final Omnibus HIPAA 
Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5573. 
 102.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(b)(2); HIPAA Omnibus Final Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. 
at 5573. 
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associate, as discussed in Section III.A.3 infra.103 
This expansion of HIPAA’s reach makes business associates, including 
subcontractors who satisfy HIPAA’s definition of BAs, directly liable for civil 
monetary, and in some cases criminal, penalties for violations of applicable 
HIPAA rules.104 
3. Agency Liability of Covered Entities and Business Associates 
In addition to being liable for their own HIPAA violations, covered entities 
and business associates also can be liable for civil monetary penalties for their 
agents’ violations.105 Under the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, a CE or BA “is liable, in 
accordance with the federal common law of agency, for a civil money penalty 
for a violation based on the act or omission of any agent of the covered entity [or 
business associate] . . . acting within the scope of the agency.”106 Agents of CEs 
may include a workforce member or business associate, whereas agents of BAs 
may include a workforce member or a subcontractor.107 HHS intended this 
revision “to ensure, where a covered entity or business associate has delegated 
out an obligation under the HIPAA Rules, that a covered entity or business 
associate would remain liable for penalties for the failure of its business associate 
agent to perform the obligation on the covered entity or business associate’s 
behalf,” even if a compliant business associate agreement is in place.108 
In adopting this revision, HHS expressed its view that liability for agency 
violations would not unduly burden CEs or BAs, finding that liability for agents 
is customary under the common law.109 HHS explained that whether a BA will 
be deemed an agent is a fact-specific inquiry that considers the terms of the BAA 
and the totality of the circumstances involved in the relationship between the 
parties.110 Importantly, HHS rejected comments suggesting that parties could 
 
 103.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5572; see also Leyva, supra 
note 65 (“A person/entity (“Person”) becomes a Business Associate by definition, and NOT 
because there happens to be a Business Associate contract in place; therefore liability attaches 
immediately when a Person “creates, receives, maintains, or transmits Protected Health 
Information on behalf of a Covered Entity.”) (emphasis in original). 
 104.  See 45 C.F.R. § 160.402(a); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
5589. 
 105.  45 C.F.R. § 160.402(c); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
5580.  
 106.  45 C.F.R. § 160.402(c)(1)-(2). HHS omitted from Section 160.402 the prior 
exception to agency liability “for covered entity liability for the acts of its agent in cases where 
the agent is a business associate, the relevant contract requirements have been met, the covered 
entity did not know of a pattern or practice of the business associate in violation of the contract, 
and the covered entity did not fail to act as required by the Privacy or Security Rule with 
respect to such violations.” Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5580. 
 107.  45 C.F.R. § 160.402(c)(1)-(2). 
 108.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5580. 
 109.  Id. at 5581. 
 110.  Id. 
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avoid these fact-intensive inquiries by determining agency in their contracts. 
Using terms, statements, or labels such as independent contractor to refer to a 
party in the contract will not control the agency analysis.111 
Rather, agency analysis focuses on whether the covered entity, or business 
associate, in the context of business associate-subcontractor relationships, has 
“the right or authority . . . to control the business associate’s conduct in the course 
of performing a service on behalf of the covered entity [or business 
associate].”112 An example of the type of control that distinguishes agency from 
non-agency relationships is when a covered entity or business associate has 
authority to give interim instructions or directions during the course of the 
relationship. But agency generally will not exist where a BAA “sets terms and 
conditions that create contractual obligations between the two parties.”113 As 
HHS explained, “if the only avenue of control is for a covered entity to amend 
the terms of the agreement or sue for breach of contract, this generally indicates 
that a business associate is not acting as an agent.”114 Thus, where a covered 
entity delegates or contracts out performance of a specific HIPAA obligation, 
whether the business associate is an agent of the CE will “depend on the right or 
authority to control the business associate’s conduct in the performance of the 
delegated service based on the right of a covered entity to give interim 
instructions.”115 
HHS also identified several factors to consider in determining the scope of 
agency: (1) the time, place, and purpose of a business associate’s conduct; (2) 
whether a business associate’s agent engaged in a course of conduct subject to a 
covered entity’s control; (3) whether a business associate agent’s conduct is 
commonly done by a business associate to accomplish the service performed on 
behalf of a covered entity; and (4) whether the covered entity reasonably 
expected that a business associate agent would engage in the conduct in 
question.116 
In rejecting a commenter’s suggestion that there would be no agency liability 
when a BA breaches the BAA, HHS explained that just because a BA deviates 
from the terms of a BAA does not mean that the BA is operating outside of the 
scope of agency.117 As a general rule, a BA’s conduct is within the scope of 
agency when it “occurs during the performance of the assigned work or incident 
 
 111.  Id.; see also Leyva, supra note 65 (“Covered Entities and Business Associates are 
liable for the acts of their Business Associate agents. Comment: the Federal Common Law of 
Agency is controlling AND Covered Entities and Business Associates need to pay close 
attention to the amount of control they exercise over a third party with which they have a 
Business Associate contract. What the parties call each other is not dispositive; exercise of 
control is key” (emphasis in original).) 
 112.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5581. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See id. 
 117.  Id. at 5582. 
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to such work, regardless of whether the work was done carelessly, a mistake was 
made in the performance, or the business associate disregarded a covered entity’s 
specific instruction.”118 But a BA generally acts outside of the scope of agency 
when its conduct “is solely for its own benefit (or that of a third party)” or the 
conduct is “not intended to serve any purpose of the covered entity.”119 
An important consideration in determining if the BA is an agent is the type 
of service and skill level required to perform the service.120 For example, HHS 
opined that it is unlikely that a business associate hired by a small provider to de-
identify PHI would be deemed its agent since it is unlikely the covered entity has 
the requisite expertise with this particular service to give interim instructions to 
the BA.121 A business associate hired to perform services that a covered entity is 
legally or otherwise prohibited from performing, such as accreditation, is 
unlikely to be deemed to be an agent of that covered entity.122 But a covered 
entity does not need to retain the right or authority to control every aspect of a 
BA’s activities for the BA to be an agent.123 Further, a BA can be an agent even 
if the CE does not exercise its right of control as long as there is evidence that it 
has the authority to do so.124 HHS further made clear that agency can be found 
even where CEs and BAs are geographically dispersed, including if they are in 
different countries.125 
Carlos Leyva recently noted that although “Business Associates and 
Covered Entities should clearly recognize that we are definitely ‘not in Kansas 
anymore,’” he does not believe the healthcare industry has fully realized the 
implications of these changes.126 As some have observed, agency liability 
“significantly impacts the relationship of covered entities and their business 
associates, potentially requiring greater monitoring by the covered entity when 
 
 118.  Id. But cf. id. at 5587 (“An agent that fails to notify a covered entity or business 
associate may be acting outside its scope of authority as an agent.”) 
 119.  Id. at 5582. 
 120.  Id. at 5581. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 5581-82. 
 123.  Id. at 5582. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Leyva, supra note 65. See generally HHS Issues HIPAA/HITECH Omnibus Final 
Rule Ushering in Significant Changes to Existing Regulations: Client Alert, PROSKAUER (Jan. 
29, 2013), http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alert/hhs-issues-hipaa-hitech-
omnibus-final-rule-ushering-in-significant-changes-to-existing-regulations/ (“Business 
associates, including Health Information Organizations, E-prescribing Gateways, entities that 
provide data transmission services for PHI and require routine access to such PHI, and 
personal health record vendors will have additional work to do as well, including: drafting and 
adopting policies, procedures and related documents if they do not have them in place already; 
performing and documenting risk assessments if they have not done so; and reviewing their 
relationships with subcontractors and entering into business associate agreements with them 
as necessary.”). 
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the business associate is an agent.”127 CEs and BAs have to wrestle with these 
fact sensitive issues so they can assess the risks of liability from different 
relationships. They also need to engage in ongoing risk assessment before and 
during contractual relationships to monitor compliance by downstream actors. 
OCR is responsible for enforcing the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, and 
OCR Director Leon Rodriguez recently commented that “[o]ne of the most 
consistent findings [OCR is seeing] is failure to conduct risk assessments of 
where protected health information is vulnerable.”128 
CEs and BAs have a great deal of work ahead of them.129 As the Proskauer 
law firm noted, “[c]overed entities and business associates will have to consider 
carefully how decisions to delegate responsibility for tasks such as handling 
breach notification and their retention of authority to provide instructions to their 
business associates and contractors with respect to certain tasks will affect their 
exposure to liability.”130 Updating and renegotiating BAAs, for example, is a 
“massive” undertaking, especially for large health systems that can have as many 
as 20,000 business associates.131 On January 25, 2013, HHS published an 
updated sample business associate agreement that may be of some assistance, 
although CEs and BAs almost certainly will need to supplement this sample.132 
Negotiations could be more contentious and protracted now that BAs’ direct 
 
 127.  Rebecca L. Williams et al., Advisories: New Omnibus Rule Released: HIPAA Puts 
on More Weight, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.dwt.com/New-
Omnibus-Rule-Released-HIPAA-Puts-on-More-Weight-01-23-2013/. 
 128.  See Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, HIPAA Omnibus Compliance Help on Way HHS 
Rolling Out Web-based Educational Tools, HEALTHCAREINFOSECURITY (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://www.healthcareinfosecurity.com/hipaa-omnibus-compliance-help-on-way-a-5524. 
 129.  See generally Leyva, supra note 65 (“HHS is saying that compliance with the 
HIPAA Security Rule was required (to a degree) even before the HITECH Act and the HIPAA 
Omnibus Rule. Therefore, the new HIPAA Security Rule requirements should just necessitate 
incremental adjustments. Although that may be true under the ‘letter of the law,’ as a practical 
matter nothing could be further from the truth. Prior to the HITECH Act HIPAA was an 
unenforced paper tiger. Business Associates have a lot of catching up to do, and for that matter, 
so do most Covered Entities.”). 
 130.  Proskauer, supra note 126. The standard for breach notice has changed due to the 
Omnibus HIPAA Rule. Before, notification was only required if a breach caused a “significant 
risk of harm” to the data subjects. Deven McGraw, Final HIPAA Rules a Major Step Forward, 
but There’s More Work To Be Done, IHEALTHBEAT (Feb, 8, 2013), 
http://www.ihealthbeat.org/perspectives/2013/final-hipaa-rules-a-major-step-forward-but-
theres-more-work-to-be-done.aspx. Now, however, notification is always required unless the 
discovering entity “demonstrates that there is a low probability that the protected health 
information has been compromised based on a risk assessment” of a number of listed factors.” 
Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 45, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5695. 
 131.  Kendra Casey Plank, Breach, Business Associate Obligations Biggest Provisions in 
HIPAA Rule, Experts Say, BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (Jan. 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/newsID/c1deaa8b-8191-4cb4-9f52-
1e7d61986de2/fuseaction/news.detail. 
 132.  Sample Business Associate Agreement Provisions, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS. (Jan. 25, 2013), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/contractprov.html. 
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liability gives them more reason to be cautious.133 
Although the Omnibus HIPAA Rule became effective on March 26, 2013, 
covered entities and business associates had until September 23, 2013 to comply 
with most of its requirements.134 A written contract or other arrangement 
between a CE and BA that was entered into before January 25, 2013, complied 
with the law then in effect, and was not renewed or modified from March 26, 
2013 until September 23, 2013 will be deemed compliant with the Omnibus 
HIPAA Rule until the earlier of the date it is renewed or modified on or after 
September 23, 2013, or September 22, 2014.135 
4. Increased Penalties and Enforcement 
This increased liability for BAs comes as HHS finalizes HITECH’s 
enhanced civil monetary penalties for noncompliance with HIPAA’s 
requirements.136 Before HITECH, HHS could impose no greater than $100 for 
each violation, with an annual cap of $25,000 imposed on a given covered entity 
for identical violations.137 The Omnibus HIPAA Rule adopted a revised penalty 
scheme with penalty amounts ranging from $100 to $50,000 per violation up to 
a maximum aggregate penalty of $1.5 million for violations of an identical 
provision per calendar year.138 Thus, if CEs and BAs violate multiple provisions, 
the maximum aggregate penalty will be $1.5 million per identical violation.139 
In addition to the threat of increased penalty amounts, OCR has indicated 
that it is focused on increasing enforcement efforts, no matter the size of the 
entities.140 Historically, HIPAA enforcement has been lackluster. But Theodore 
J. Kobus III from Baker & Hostetler in New York described OCR enforcement 
efforts as “aggressive” since HITECH.141 Lynn Sessions with Baker & Hostetler 
in Houston similarly noted that HHS increasingly has been pursuing resolution 
agreements and civil penalties against “relatively small providers,” who “often 
 
 133.  Anne Foster et al., Special Edition: Health Law Update: A Baker’s Dozen of 
Significant Changes from the HIPAA/HITECH Rule, BAKERHOSTETLER (Feb. 28, 2013), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/special-edition-health-law-update-feb-42876/. 
 134.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 45, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566.  
 135.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.532(e) (2013). 
 136.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 45, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566.  
 137.  Id. at 5582. 
 138.  45 C.F.R. § 160.404; Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 45, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 5577, 5583. 
 139.  See, e.g., Leyva, supra note 65 (observing that “there is no theoretical maximum 
fine per year” because the maximum will depend “on how many different kinds of violations 
are found”). 
 140.  Kendra Casey Plank, Enforcement, Compliance Become Hot Topics for Covered 
Entities with Final HIPAA Rule, BLOOMBERG BNA HEALTH IT L. & INDUSTRY REP. (Jan. 28, 
2013); Anna Spencer & Julie Wagner, OCR to Covered Entities: Choose Carefully Among 
Cloud Service Providers, BLOOMBERG BNA HEALTH IT L. & INDUSTRY REP. (Feb. 18, 2013). 
 141.  Plank, Enforcement, Compliance, supra note 140. 
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are less prepared to comply with HIPAA requirements.”142 A privacy scholar 
also has credited OCR for being a “more active” privacy enforcer than FTC.143 
In April 2012, for example, OCR reached a $100,000 settlement with 
Phoenix Cardiac Surgery, P.C. (“PCS”), a small cardiology practice.144 PCS 
allegedly violated HIPAA by, among other things, failing to enter BAAs with 
cloud service providers that stored and had access to electronic PHI and failing 
to establish adequate policies and safeguards to protect PHI.145 OCR Director 
Leon Rodriguez recently indicated that enforcement under the Omnibus HIPAA 
Rule “will become tougher” and will include enforcement resulting from breach 
investigations and random audits.146 Reportedly, from September 2009 through 
December 2012, OCR received 77,200 HIPAA complaints, investigated 27,500 
cases, issued 18,600 corrective actions, and collected $14.9 million in fines and 
resolution settlements.147 According to Director Rodriguez, OCR is “‘looking 
for patterns of privacy and security breaches,’ including violations that seem to 
be longstanding and have a high risk of causing harm to individuals.”148 
B. HIPAA in the Cloud from a Patient’s Perspective 
While patients anticipate that their healthcare provider will usually engage 
in due diligence before selecting a cloud service provider, they nevertheless 
appreciate (if sometimes on a visceral or intuitive level) the risks involved in 
cloud computing scenarios. Some public opinion evidence shows that Americans 
would like less general sharing of their health data than is currently prevalent.149 
 
 142.  Id. 
143.  Robert Gellman, Who is the More Active Privacy Enforcer: FTC or OCR?, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Aug. 13, 2013), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/08/who-is-the-more-active-privacy-
enforcer-ftc-or-ocr.html. 
 144.  Spencer & Wagner, supra note 140. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Cf. Incentivising State False Claims Acts, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/clarifying-requirements-for-a-
state-false-claims-a.aspx (last updated Mar. 7, 2013) (discussing how the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005 included provisions designed to “create incentives for states to enact anti-fraud 
legislation modeled after the federal False Claims Act”). 
 147.  McGee, supra note 128. 
 148.  Id. (quoting Leon Rodriguez, Director, Office for Civil Rights, H.H.S.) 
 149.  William Pewen, Breach Notice: The Struggle for Medical Records Security 
Continues, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/10/07/breach-notice-the-struggle-for-medical-records-
security-continues/ (“[P]atients have been outraged to receive solicitations for purchases 
ranging from drugs to burial plots, while at the same time receiving care which is too often 
uncoordinated and unsafe. It is no wonder that many Americans take a circumspect view of 
health IT.”); H. Patterson & H. Nissenbaum, Context-Dependent Expectations of Privacy in 
Self-Generated Mobile Health Data, discussed at Fordham Internet of Things Conference, 
Mar. 14, 2014, at http://law.fordham.edu/center-on-law-and-information-policy/32700.htm 
(Patterson presentation starts at 5:22). 
Winter 2014] PROTECTING HEALTH PRIVACY 621 
Those numbers may well degenerate as awareness of cloud computing increases. 
Whenever there is “sharing or storage by users of their own information on 
remote servers owned or operated by others and accessed through the Internet or 
other connections,” there is legitimate concern about additional opportunities for 
hacks, breaches, or misuses to occur.150 
While covered entities and cloud service providers seek legal guidance as 
they work together to safeguard health data, patients have an interest in assuring 
that their privacy is protected. Privacy concerns of patients have slowed adoption 
of some digital records.151 Moreover, where privacy concerns have been ignored 
(as in the rapid dissemination of pharmacy dossiers by reputational 
intermediaries in the early and mid-2000s), they have led to unfair, invasive, and 
irremediable violations of the privacy of individuals.152 
The Omnibus HIPAA Rule addressed some of these concerns. For example, 
by rendering BAs directly liable for compliance with provisions of the Security 
and Privacy Rules, it clarified what could have been a source of troubling 
regulatory arbitrage.153 It applied data security rules to “downstream entities,” 
making cloud service providers of EHRs more responsible. BAs are required to 
obtain assurances that disclosures they make (that are not required by law) will 
 
 150.  Robert Gellman, Privacy in the Clouds: Risks to Privacy and Confidentiality from 
Cloud Computing, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM 4 (Feb. 23, 2009), 
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/02/WPF_Cloud_Privacy_Report.pdf. 
 151.  See generally Roger S. Magnusson, The Changing Legal and Conceptual Shape of 
Health Care Privacy, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 680, 685 (2004). Patient concerns are not 
hypothetical; data breaches have been on the rise. Reported Health Data Breaches Rose by 
97% in 2011, IHEALTHBEAT (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2012/2/1/health-data-breaches-increased-by-97-in-2011-
report-finds.aspx; Scott Gibson, Stolen Medical Records One of the Most Lucrative Forms of 
ID Theft, HEALTH CARE TECH REV. (Dec. 13, 2011), http://healthcaretechreview.com/stolen-
medical-records-lucrative/. Over twenty-first million patients have suffered data security 
breaches reported to the federal government over the past three years. See Health Information 
Services, Breaches Affecting 500 Patients or More, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breachtool.html 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
 152.  See, e.g., Chad Terhune, They Know What’s in Your Medicine Cabinet, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (July 22, 2008), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_31/b4094000643943.htm (“Two-thirds 
of all health insurers are using prescription data—not only to deny coverage to individuals and 
families but also to charge some customers higher premiums or exclude certain medical 
conditions from policies, according to agents and others in the industry.”); Sarah Ludington, 
Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 
140, 162 (2006) (“Without consent, CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (CVS) ‘mined’ its customer 
prescription records for the purpose of sending its customers mailings targeted to their specific 
medical conditions. . . .”). 
 153.  Marianne K. McGee, HIPAA Omnibus Rule Released, Contains Long-Overdue Rule 
Modifications, DATA BREACH TODAY (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://www.databreachtoday.com/hipaa-omnibus-rule-released-a-5433. 
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be “confidential.” Civil penalties for BAs also provide important incentives for 
proper behavior. 
As rulemaking (and clarifications of rules) continues, predictable criticisms 
have been launched. Some insist that complexity in their fields can never truly 
be grasped by regulators or rendered clear to consumers. Others accuse HHS of 
engaging in stealth industrial policy, picking winners and losers in the healthcare 
field by effectively outlawing certain business models and promoting others. The 
question now is how to respect legitimate efforts to innovate, while still 
protecting vital patient interests in privacy (and understanding how data is being 
used and shared). 
1. Patient Rights of Access to Records and Accountings of 
Disclosures 
Before HITECH, the HIPAA Privacy Rule made it very difficult for patients 
to fully understand the nature and range of health information accumulated about 
them, especially because disclosures for “treatment, payment and health care 
operations” did not need to be accounted for.154 After HITECH, any record kept 
electronically needs to be in the accounting.155 Such accountings promote 
individuals’ rights to understand how their records have been used.156 In any 
twelve month period, the first accounting requested by an individual from a 
covered entity must be provided for free within 60 days of the request (with some 
narrow exceptions).157 
 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Before HITECH, 45 C.F.R. § 164.528 restricted the right to an accounting of 
disclosures by exempting disclosures that were “to carry out treatment, payment and health 
care operations.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.528(a)(1)(i) (2013). HITECH removed that exception. 42 
U.S.C. § 17935 (2010) (“In applying section 164.528 of title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, 
in the case that a covered entity uses or maintains an electronic health record with respect to 
protected health information . . . the exception under paragraph (a)(1)(i) of such section shall 
not apply to disclosures through an electronic health record made by such entity of such 
information . . . .”). 
 156.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.528 (2014). Such accountings must include “(i) The date of the 
disclosure; (ii) The name of the entity or person who received the protected health information 
and, if known, the address of such entity or person; (iii) A brief description of the protected 
health information disclosed; and (iv) A brief statement of the purpose of the disclosure that 
reasonably informs the individual of the basis for the disclosure or, in lieu of such statement, 
a copy of a written request for a disclosure under §§164.502(a)(2)(ii) or 164.512, if any.” Id. 
§ 164.528(b)(2). 
 157.  Id. § 164.528(c)(2) (“The covered entity must provide the first accounting to an 
individual in any 12 month period without charge. The covered entity may impose a 
reasonable, cost-based fee for each subsequent request for an accounting by the same 
individual within the 12 month period, provided that the covered entity informs the individual 
in advance of the fee and provides the individual with an opportunity to withdraw or modify 
the request for a subsequent accounting in order to avoid or reduce the fee.”). Patients may 
also direct a CE to transmit a copy of the record to a designee, and there are limits on the fee, 
which cannot be more than the labor cost involved, and images and other linked data are to be 
included. Id. 
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 If patients are to fully “buy in” to digitization of health records (and the full 
array of opportunities for use of them), they will need to be able to understand 
how their digital records exist (and are used) in an increasingly complex virtual 
landscape. There are more and less plausible visions of how this understanding 
can arise. An individualistic, “self-help” perspective would require patients to 
monitor data flows on their own. For example, patients could demand an 
“accounting of disclosures” of their protected health information on a regular 
basis. However, policymakers need to be sensitive to patients’ willingness and 
ability to “take control” of, or even monitor, their digital health profiles. 
Ironically, it may well be that the persons least capable of expending the effort 
needed to protect privacy (on an individual-based model) are most in need of 
self-defense. The individual-based model of privacy self-protection also is 
premised on information being available in formats that allow patients to 
understand its meaning, use, and processing. Unfortunately, this is still a work in 
progress, as providers struggle to meet myriad legal and clinical requirements for 
their own use of EHRs and have little time or inclination to optimize the systems 
for patients.  
Fortunately, there is a middle way between individualistic, personal control 
and monitoring models of health privacy, and no individual participation 
whatsoever. For example, individuals may hire their own trusted interpreters to 
make sense of data, or nonprofit groups could help fund “navigators” to empower 
patients. The law requires an “accounting of disclosures” of protected health 
information,158 but it will take institutional development for the rights to such 
information to be fully realized.  
It is possible that the “use of audit trails and the right to an accounting of 
disclosures improves the detection of breaches and assists with the identification 
of weaknesses in privacy and security practices,”159 but we should not rely on 
patients to do all this work themselves. Audit logs record the activity taking place 
in an information-sharing network, including “queries made by users, the 
information accessed, information flows between systems, and date- and time-
markers for those activities;”160 it may take professional assistance for the 
 
 158.  45 C.F.R. § 164.528. 
 159.  HIPAA Privacy Rule Accounting of Disclosures Under the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 31427 (proposed May 31, 
2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 164), available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2011/05/31/2011-13297/hipaa-privacy-rule-
accounting-of-disclosures-under-the-health-information-technology-for-economic#p-34 
[hereinafter HIPAA Privacy Rule Notice of Proposed Rulemaking]. See also 45 C.F.R. § 
170.210 (2011) (explaining “[t]he date, time, patient identification, and user identification 
must be recorded when electronic health information is created, modified, accessed or deleted; 
and an indication of which action(s) occurred and by whom must also be recorded.”). 
 160.  Implementing a Trusted Information Sharing Environment: Using Immutable Audit 
Logs to Increase Security, Trust, and Accountability, MARKLE FOUND. at 1 (Feb. 1, 2006), 
http://www.markle.org/publications/565-implementing-trusted-information-sharing-
environment. The Markle Foundation has worked on several important reports on deploying 
cutting edge information technology in agencies, including HHS. Id. at 4. 
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layman to fully make sense of them or detect untoward activity. If audit logs are 
immutable and pervasively attributable to entities accessing and using 
information, they should seriously deter misuse of data.161 HITECH tries to 
protect patients from misuse of their health information by requiring the use of 
“audit trails” to record each instance of access to a record and creating incentives 
for the use of encryption and other best practices.162 
There are always going to be complaints from regulated entities about the 
burdens additional recordkeeping can impose. But the pervasive malleability of 
digital systems should lead us to take these objections with a grain of salt. 
Moreover, those who purchase rigid, unalterable systems may have assumed the 
risk of needing to engage in expensive upgrades. HHS clearly has confirmed the 
importance of maintaining patients’ access to their records, and the rise of a 
consumer-directed health care movement before HITECH also signalled the 
importance of patient access to data.163  
 
 161. 45 C.F.R. § 170.302 (2011) (“Record actions related to electronic health information 
in accordance with the standard specified in § 170.210(b) . . . [and] [g]enerate audit log [by] 
[e]nabl[ing] a user to generate an audit log for a specific time period and to sort entries in the 
audit log according to any of the elements specified in the standard at 170.210(b).”); Health 
Information Technology: Initial Set of Standards, Implementation Specifications, and 
Certification Criteria for Electronic Health Record Technology, 75 Fed. Reg. 44590-91 
(proposed July 28, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170) (requiring that Certified EHR 
technology have the following capabilities “to, at a minimum, support eligible professionals’ 
and eligible hospitals’ efforts to achieve what had been proposed for meaningful use Stage 1 
under the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs proposed rule.”). For a discussion 
of the importance of immutable audit logs, see Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, 
Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1473 
(2011) (explaining that “[i]mmutable audit logs . . . [promote] data integrity and relevance. . . . 
[by] watermark[ing data] with its provenance, assuring attributions and verifiability of 
observations (much as citations help assure the validity of an assertion in an academic 
work)[and promoting] tethering and full attribution of data to allow corrections to propagate 
through the system”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 162.  John W. Hill et al., A Proposed NHIN Architecture, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 503, 517 
(2011) (“HITECH expanded the reach of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule. Patients must now be 
notified when their PHI is disclosed or used without their authorization. HITECH closed the 
loophole for business associates, established patients’ right to access and control of their PHI 
(including obtaining an audit trail showing all electronic disclosures), and prohibited 
companies from selling PHI without authorization.”); Sandra Nunn, Managing Audit Trails, 
80 J. AM. HEALTH INFO. 44, 44 (2009) (Audit trails are “records with retention requirements.”). 
The audit trail is a sine qua non for technological due process; Danielle Keats Citron, 
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1305-06 (2008) (exploring the due 
process implications of automated system determinations and arguing that technological due 
process requires the inclusion of audit trails into automated systems). Nevertheless, even this 
mechanism of protection must be carefully implemented so that the audit process itself does 
not create its own potential for breaches. See, e.g., Dom Nicastro, HIPAA Auditor Involved in 
Own Data Breach, HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (Aug. 8, 2011), 
http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-1/PHY-269480/HIPAA-Auditor-Involved-in-
Own-Data-Breach (firm hired to conduct audits lost an unencrypted flash drive with 4,500 
patient records).  
 163.  As regulations require, covered entities must provide individuals “with access to the 
protected health information in the form and format requested by the individual, if it is readily 
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2. Encryption, De-Identification, and Best Practices in an Era of 
Breaches 
Part II above described some potential cutting edge applications of cloud 
computing to solve tough problems in pharmacovigilance and treatment 
customization. It suggested the growing convergence of research and treatment 
functions in data-rich environments.164 Two of the most important issues 
affecting health technology policy are transparency and access. Regulators must 
decide whether to permit innovators to control data flows in order to give them 
incentives, and where such control must end in order to respect broader social 
concerns about privacy. Individuals are justly concerned that data or specimens 
related to them can be used in ways that compromise future opportunities. 
Research data may be even more sensitive than entries about a patient’s existing 
conditions and complaints, since it can include direct and incidental findings 
whose implications have not been fully considered and explored by the 
patient.165 
Can HIPAA and cognate state laws harmonize to promote optimal standards 
for data collection, use, analysis, and encryption? One way to reassure patients 
that their data will not be misused is to reduce or encrypt the linkage between 
data and its source.166 Various legal regimes have created a complex set of 
terminologies for indicating how well-linked given data is to its source.167 
Barbara Evans’s account of the “networked” nature of pharmacogenomic 
discovery would help health IT policymakers grasp the potential of information 
flows, and how unharmonized legal requirements can impede innovation.168 
 
producible in such form and format.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(c)(2)(2013). 
 164.  Susan Wolf has done groundbreaking work on the growing importance of treatment 
issues in research settings, and vice versa, in the context of “incidental findings” during 
research. See Susan M. Wolf, Incidental Findings in Neuroscience Research: A Fundamental 
Challenge to the Structure of Bioethics and Health Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
NEUROETHICS 623 (Judy Illes & Barbara Sahakian eds. 2011). 
 165.  See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects 
Research: Analysis and Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 241 (2008) (noting 
that an incidental finding may reveal sensitive data the patient may not want shared). 
 166.  Harley Geiger, HHS Should Require the Encryption of Portable Devices to Curb 
Health Data Breaches, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (March 16, 2011), 
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/harley-geiger/hhs-should-require-encryption-portable-devices-
curb-health-data-breaches. 
 167.  See Joseph Conn, Data Encryption Just One Option Under Security Law, 
MODERNHEALTHCARE.COM, (May 12, 2009, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20090512/NEWS/305129979 (explaining some of 
the different levels of encryption in HIPAA, such as de-identified records compared to records 
with limited data sets). Encryption can be an important defense against improper access. Brian 
T. Horowitz, Health Care IT: Securing Health Care Information: 10 Ways to Defend Against 
Data Breaches, EWEEK.COM (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Health-Care-
IT/Securing-Health-Care-Information-10-Ways-to-Defend-Against-Data-Breaches-
762368/?kc=rss. 
 168.  Barbara Evans, Ethical and Privacy Issues in Pharmacogenomic Research, in 
PHARMACOGENOMICS: APPLICATIONS TO PATIENT CARE 325 (Howard L. McLeod et al. eds., 
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Limits on access and reuse reflect growing concerns: as stories of breaches and 
new data uses proliferate, data subjects need more robust assurances about 
controlled data dissemination.169 As databases proliferate, the risk of re-
identification of de-identified data through the use of information from multiple 
sources increases, so that fewer data points are necessary to personally identify 
the subject of the data. Whatever rules govern the emerging infrastructure of 
health data surveillance and sharing, they will need to be complemented by 
monitoring that seeks to detect and deter inappropriate uses of information.170 
Part IV, infra, proposes some methods of making that monitoring more effective, 
such as the funding of technologists (such as the technologists funded by the FTC 
to help that agency develop better mobile privacy policies) and the deployment 
of contingency-funded contractors (such as the Recovery Audit Contractors 
(RACs) already deployed by CMS to detect and deter fraud and abuse) —and 
perhaps even, in an era of big data, the types of de-identified data that may 
eventually be re-identified.171 
3. Marketing, Sale, and the Vagaries of Consent 
The Omnibus HIPAA Rule has helped clarify the obligations of CEs who 
want to engage in sale, marketing, or research uses of protected health 
information.172 For marketing, a CE needs to obtain a patient’s authorization if 
it receives financial remuneration in exchange for communicating about a health-
related product or service.173 Before the communication can be made, the 
 
2d ed. 2009). 
 169.  OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BREACHES OF 
UNSECURED PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 1, 
9-10 (2009-10), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breachrept.pdf. 
 170.  See generally Evans, supra note 168, at 313-38 (discussing the concerns and 
solutions regarding data flow). 
 171.  For recent analyses of the re-identification issue, see Felix Wu, Privacy and Utility 
in Data Sets, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (Aug. 15, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2031808; OCR, GUIDANCE REGARDING 
METHODS FOR DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) PRIVACY RULE, 
U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., (Nov. 26, 2012), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/De-
identification/hhs_deid_guidance.pdf. 
 172. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B)(1) covers the “sale of PHI,” which is a disclosure 
of PHI when the covered entity receives direct or indirect “remuneration from or on behalf of 
the recipient of the PHI in exchange for the PHI.” The Omnibus HIPAA Rule addressed 
marketing, research, fundraising, and sale of protected health information. 
 173.  Financial remuneration is defined as “direct or indirect payment from or on behalf 
of a third party whose product or service is being described.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.501. It appears 
that nonfinancial or in-kind consideration for such communication is not covered by the 
marketing rule. See Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 45, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
5596 (confirming “that the term ‘financial remuneration’ does not include non-financial 
benefits, such as in-kind benefits, provided to a covered entity in exchange for making a 
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authorization must include the disclosure that the covered entity or business 
associate is receiving financial remuneration from a third party for making the 
communication. There do appear to be important exceptions, though. For 
example, communications about a drug or biologic presently prescribed for a 
patient can be marketed if the payment is “reasonable.” For sale of PHI, there is 
a prohibition, but there are multiple exceptions to that prohibition.174 
One key question raised here is how the consent and authorization for the 
use or disclosure of PHI for marketing and sales purposes are to be arranged.175 
A scope of authorization for subsidized communications can be broader than for 
merely a “single product or service or the products or services of one third 
party.”176 The preamble to the Omnibus HIPAA Rule notes that the new 
authorization rules “provide covered entities with a more uniform system for 
treating all remunerated communications.”177 Furthermore, “where an individual 
signs an authorization to receive such communications, the covered entity may 
use and disclose the individual’s protected health information for the purposes 
of making such communications unless or until the individual revokes the 
authorization pursuant to § 164.508(a)(5).”178 Such statements suggest an intent 
to streamline authorization requests, and models of consent that are more blanket 
than specific. 
On the other hand, Marla Durben Hirsch has argued that “use of ‘free’ EHRs 
may violate” the Omnibus HIPAA Rule because of the complexity of consent 
required to assure genuine acceptance and understanding of the business and 
 
communication about a product or service”); id. at 5597 (noting “that non-financial or in-kind 
remuneration may be received by the covered entity or its business associate and it would not 
implicate the new marketing restrictions”). 
 174.  These include exceptions for the sale, transfer, merger, or consolidation of all or part 
of a covered entity and for related due diligence purposes if the recipient of the PHI is or will 
become a Covered Entity following the sale, transfer or merger, and for research purposes. 
Uses and Disclosures of PHI under the Final Rule: Changes Related to Marketing, Research, 
Fundraising and the Sale of Protected Health Information and Other Significant Changes, 
POSINELLI SHUGHART, P.C. (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/uses-
and-disclosures-of-phi-under-the-fi-55749/; see generally Guidance: The HIPAA Privacy 
Rule and Refill Reminders and Other Communications about a Drug or Biologic Currently 
Being Prescribed for the Individual, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVCS., (Sept. 19, 
2013), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/marketingrefillreminde
r.html. 
 175.  45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3). Note that HHS’s generosity toward research uses of 
health information may lead to some regulatory arbitrage as entities might recharacterize 
information gathering as research. 45 C.F.R. §164.508(b)(3)(iii) allows for compound 
authorizations for research, reversing an earlier policy that required study-specific 
authorizations. Rachel Grunberger, HITECH Update #4: HHS Relaxes HIPAA Requirements 
for Research Authorizations, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, INSIDE PRIVACY (Jan. 20, 2013), 
http://www.insideprivacy.com/health-privacy/hitech-update-4-hhs-relaxes-hipaa-
requirements-for-research-authorizations/.  
 176.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 45, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566, 5596. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id.  
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treatment relationships they imply. Having observed that “[p]hysicians using 
cloud-based electronic health records should expect to see more pop-up and other 
types of advertisements from pharmaceutical and medical device 
manufacturers,”179 Hirsch cautions that they may require onerously specific 
consent.180 An insightful commenter observes that entirely ad-based EHR 
business models may not run afoul of marketing restrictions, but could be 
violating rules on sales of data if “the free EHR is provided to the CE ‘primarily’ 
in exchange for the PHI to be entered into the EHR.”181 The faint distinctions 
between some uses of PHI for marketing and sales purposes (and potential 
regulatory arbitrage via mere “access” to data) merit further guidance. 
There is a tension between guidance cautioning that authorization be clear 
and prominent and cost-containment pressures that will demand streamlining of 
authorization procedures. Perhaps the ideal solution will involve more granular 
and technically sophisticated consent procedures made possible by advances in 
computing.182 
 
 179.  Marla D. Hirsch, EHRs the Latest Advertising Billboard for Manufacturers, (Jan. 
23, 2013), FIERCEEMR, http://www.fierceemr.com/story/ehrs-latest-advertising-billboard-
manufacturers/2013-01-23. 
 180. Marla D. Hirsch, Use of ‘Free’ EHRs May Violate New HIPAA Rule, FIERCEEMR,  
http://www.fierceemr.com/story/use-free-ehrs-may-violate-new-hipaa-megarule/2013-01-29 
(“[HIPAA now] requires providers to obtain patient authorizations ‘for all treatment and 
healthcare operations communications where the covered entity receives financial 
remuneration for making the communications for a third party whose product or service is 
being marketed.’ . . . The megarule doesn’t specifically address pop up ads in EHRs. But the 
purpose of the ads is to market their products to physicians with the hope that they will 
prescribe, promote or sell them to patients. That sounds just like the marketing that the 
megarule is addressing. If the physician then ‘communicates’ the product or service in the ad 
without having patient authorization to do so, the physician is in violation of HIPAA.”). 
 181.  David Harlow, Comment to Use of 'Free' EHRs May Violate New HIPAA Rule, 
FIERCEEMR (Jan 31, 2013), http://www.fierceemr.com/story/use-free-ehrs-may-violate-new-
hipaa-megarule/2013-01-29 (“It appears to me that the marketing rule would be implicated 
only if there were a direct or indirect payment of money . . . . In-kind remuneration (e.g., 
provision of a free EHR) is excluded from the definition. [But] [t]he free EHR may implicate 
other sections of the rule . . . The limitation on sale of PHI . . . includes direct and indirect 
remuneration [whereas the limitation on marketing focuses on financial remuneration]. The 
commentary to the rule says that ‘a sale of protected health information occurs when the 
covered entity primarily is being compensated to supply data it maintains in its role as a 
covered entity (or business associate). Thus, such disclosures require the individual’s 
authorization unless they otherwise fall within an exception at § 164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B)(2).’ 78 
Fed. Reg 5606. Those exceptions are, essentially: (i) for public health purposes, (ii) for 
research, so long as payment is limited to the sending CE’s costs, (iii) for treatment and 
payment, (iv) in connection with a sale or merger of the CE, (v) to or by a BA where the CE 
is just paying for the BA’s services, (vi) to a patient who requests access to his or her own 
PHI, (vii) as required by law or (viii) as otherwise permitted under HIPAA where the 
remuneration covers costs only. None of these exceptions seems to apply.”). 
 182.  P. Mork et al., Architectures and Processes for Nationwide Patient-Centric Consent 
Management (2011) 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fie.archive.ubuntu.com%2Fdisk1%2F
disk1%2Fdownload.sourceforge.net%2Fpub%2Fsourceforge%2Fk%2Fka%2Fkaironconsen
ts%2Fdocs%2FNationwide%2520Patient-Centric%2520Consent%2520Mgmt.docx; CENTER 
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Such efforts will take place in the shadow of a growing First Amendment 
jurisprudence protecting data flows. There is already a vast and growing 
literature on the use of observational data to promote medical research.183 All 
involved understand undue restriction of information flows may impede 
innovation and undermine public health.184 But the commercial use of data to 
market drugs and other interventions has not been adequately addressed by 
public interest groups, academics, or governmental entities.  
4. Are Non-Covered Entities Creating Medical Reputations? 
Assume, for now, that all the issues raised above are adequately addressed 
by regulators and stakeholders. Individuals would still be right to worry that their 
medical reputations—if not their medical records—are being created in 
processes that they can barely control or understand. As Nicolas Terry has 
explained, judgments about individuals’ health status do not need to be based on 
medical records: 
 
The health care sector and its stakeholders constitute an area 
considerably larger than the HIPAA-regulated zone. As a result, some 
traditional health information circulates in what may be termed a 
HIPAA-free zone. Further, the very concept of health sector specific 
regulation is flawed because health related or medically inflected data 
frequently circulates outside of the traditionally recognized health care 
sector. In both cases agreed-upon health privacy exceptionalism is 
jeopardized.185 
 
In an era of Big Data, companies do not even need to consult the “health care 
sector” to impute various medical conditions or disabilities to data subjects. 
Consider, for instance, Charles Duhigg’s reporting on data mining by Target: the 
 
FOR TRANSFORMING HEALTH/MITRE CORP., Meaningful Choice: Enabling Patients to 
Selectively Manage Access to Their Health Records (2011) (“MITRE’s research allows the 
patient to express their desired level of granular control; it is then up to the record holder (such 
as the hospital) to request the current preferences and then use them to package the records for 
the information exchange.”); Arnon Rosenthal, Digital Policies for Patient Consents: The 
Thorny (and General) Technical Challenges, MITRE Corp. (2011) (“Our project is 
architecting and prototyping key elements of a system to elicit and manage consents. All of a 
patient’s consent rules are to be managed in one place, editable over the web, and accessible 
by authorized record holders.”).  
 183.  BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 141, INST. OF MED. (2009) (“observational 
studies play in increasingly critical role” in research).  
 184.  CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION 14 (2007) (describing 
how integrated information systems may be able to condense some medical research into a 
matter of weeks or months, rather than the years that are customary now). 
 185.  Nicolas Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2153269. 
630 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:595 
company prides itself on knowing whether customers are pregnant.186 
ProPublica has documented data brokers’ interest in health-inflected data: 
 
Data companies can capture information about your “interests” in 
certain health conditions based on what you buy — or what you search 
for online. Datalogix has lists of people classified as “allergy 
sufferers” and “dieters.” Acxiom sells data on whether an individual 
has an “online search propensity” for a certain “ailment or 
prescription.”187 
 
According to FTC Commissioner Julie Brill, “One firm, LeadsPlease.com, 
reportedly sells the names, mailing addresses, and medication lists of people with 
diseases like cancer or clinical depression. Another data broker, ALC Data, 
reportedly offers lists of consumers, their credit scores, and their specific 
ailments.”188 
It is clear that healthcare companies are also developing an interest in 
cognate data.189 Consider, as this diagram shows, all the sources that could 
collect such data: 
 
 
 186.  Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Feb. 
16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-
habits.html?pagewanted=all. 
 187.  Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About You, 
PROPUBLICA (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-about-
what-data-brokers-know-about-you.  
 188.  Julie Brill, Reclaim Your Name, Keynote Address at Computers, Freedom, and 
Privacy Conference (June 26, 2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/130626computersfreedom.pdf.  
 189.  Id. (“One health insurance company recently bought data on more than three million 
people’s consumer purchases in order to flag health-related actions, like purchasing plus-sized 
clothing, the Wall Street Journal reported. (The company bought purchasing information for 
current plan members, not as part of screening people for potential coverage.)”).  
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Image Credit: Federal Trade Commission. 
 
And how far data brokers could go to combine and recombine those sources: 
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Social networks have also intensified the surveillance of health-inflected 
data. But these platform providers enjoy a largely deregulated online 
environment. As social networks such as PatientsLikeMe organized around 
personal health records provide novel and powerful opportunities to address 
health issues and to form communities, they also open the door to frightening 
and manipulative uses of data by firms, governments, employers, and ranking 
intermediaries.190 
Social network profiles are sometimes less accessible than search engine 
results thanks to passwords and privacy settings. But many users never take steps 
to keep their profile private, and data miners have already logged details of 
profiles. Facebook can suddenly reset defaults, causing what James 
Grimmelmann calls “privacy lurches” to unexpectedly expose aspects of profiles 
that users once thought were only visible to themselves and friends. Many users 
fail to change the default settings, effectively making that part of their life online 
an “open book.” Moreover, lacking “visceral notice” of the accessibility of their 
profiles, many users explicitly or implicitly assume that only their friends are 
seeing it (since they are usually the only group able to comment on postings). 
Very few take the basic privacy step of logging out and then trying to access their 
own account via another, “dummy” account, to see the picture of themselves that 
they are broadcasting to the world at large. And a social network profile is only 
a small fraction of the “data trail” generated by persons as they use the internet. 
Such data profiles have real consequences for the data subjects they are 
connected to, however unaware the latter may be of the former. Job candidates 
are ranked by what their online activities say about their creativity and 
leadership.191 Both firms and data brokers increasingly try to integrate thousands 
of sources of information into profiles. The profiles are actionable, whether 
inside or outside the firm in which they are compiled. Runaway data can lead to 
cascading disadvantages. Once one piece of software has classified a person as 
a bad credit risk, a bad worker, or a poor consumer, that attribute may appear 
with decision-making clout in other systems all over the economy. As the astute 
privacy journalist Kashmir Hill has noted, there is little in current law to prevent 
 
 190.  A company called Acxiom has 1,600 pieces of information about 98% of United 
States adults, gathered from thousands of sources. ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE 3 (2011). 
At least some of them are health-indicative or health-predictive. Such information will only 
be more valuable to employers as self-insured health plans become more common. DAN 
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION (2009); Natasha Singer, You for Sale: Mapping the 
Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-consumer-
database-marketing.html?pagewanted=all.  
191. See Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2013, at 
72, 76. 
Winter 2014] PROTECTING HEALTH PRIVACY 633 
companies from selling their profiles of you.192 There are also legitimate worries 
about discriminatory uses of information either not covered by extant privacy or 
anti-discrimination laws or undetectable by workers.193 
Efforts to assure the fairness and accuracy of such reputation-affecting 
information have not caught up to technological advances in producing it. For 
example, an investigating office may tailor its software to assure that the most 
damaging information available about a person (from its perspective) comes up 
first in whatever databases it queries.194 The applicant would need to use the 
same personalizing software to be fully aware of all the negative information 
such a search was generating. Yet trade secrecy and contracts will likely prevent 
him from ever accessing an exact replica of the programs used by the educators, 
employers, landlords, bankers, and others making vital decisions about his 
future. Some digital scarlet letter could be floating in the ether, prominent to 
those with certain filtering programs, and virtually invisible to others. 
The cost of information storage has consistently declined over time, and 
recent developments suggest even more dramatic advances toward “total recall” 
by computerized networks.195 As privacy expert Helen Nissenbaum has 
observed, “anything about an individual that can be rendered in digital form can 
be stored over indefinitely long periods and be readily retrieved.”196 Joseph 
Turow’s book, The Daily You, describes in great detail the kinds of profiles that 
can result from the endless search for data.197 Social networks can both generate 
and use such data to create secret profiles. Those profiles, in turn, may be of 
interest to far more than advertisers. Police and other officials need little more 
than a subpoena to review such files.198 Data brokers are keen to monetize their 
information trove. 
Health-inflected information from entities not covered as either CEs or BAs 
under HIPAA can be a critical source of correlations, profiles, and attributions. 
Companies are not shy about using and distributing the information; for example, 
 
192. Kashmir Hill, Could Target Sell Its ‘Pregnancy Prediction Score’?, FORBES (Feb. 
16, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/could-target-sell-its-
pregnancy-prediction-score/. 
 193.  Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of Electronic Health Records 
on the Workplace, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 422 (2010) (raising the possibility of a 
growing use of “complex scoring algorithms based on EHRs to determine which individuals 
are likely to be high-risk and high-cost workers”). 
 194.  For fuller explanation of these technologies, see Frank Pasquale, Reputation 
Regulation, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 111 (Martha Nussbaum & Saul Levmore, eds., 2010). 
 195.  VICTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE (2009).  
 196.  Helen Nissenbaum, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 36 (2008); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as 
Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 129 (2004).  
 197.  JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU (2011) (describing online internet advertising 
markets for data). 
 198.  Chris Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other 
Commercial Data Brokers Collect, Process, and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 
29 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (Summer 2004). 
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PatientsLikeMe.com states “you should expect that every piece of information 
you submit (even if it is not currently displayed) may be shared with our partners 
and any member of PatientsLikeMe.”199 Users later found that “Nielsen Co., [a] 
media-research firm . . . was ‘scraping,’ or copying, every single message off 
PatientsLikeMe’s private online forums.”200 Maybe they had internalized the 
platform’s rules, but who could have anticipated the outside firm’s copying or 
use of such data? Had the virtual break-in not been detected, health attributes 
connected to usernames (which, in turn, often can be linked to real identities) 
could have spread into numerous databases. 
For those in the individual insurance market, the risk of runaway health data 
has already been realized. Patients who purchased antidepressants were later 
denied insurance repeatedly, thanks to a dossier sold to insurers. Consider, for 
instance, the plight of Walter and Paula Shelton, a Louisiana couple who sought 
insurance while in their fifties.201 Paula had taken an antidepressant as a sleep 
aid, and occasionally used a blood pressure medication to relieve some swelling 
in her ankles. Humana, a large insurer based in Kentucky, refused to insure the 
couple based on that prescription history. They were not able to find insurance 
from other carriers, either.202 No one had explained to them that a few 
prescriptions could render them uninsurable. Indeed, the model for blackballing 
them may still have been a gleam in an entrepreneur’s eye when Mrs. Shelton 
obtained her drugs. It became a big business: prescription-reporting service 
Intelliscript claimed in 2008 that clients using it reported “financial returns of 
5:1, 10:1, even 20:1.” 
According to BusinessWeek’s Chad Terhune, who first reported on the 
Sheltons, use of prescription data has been widespread in the individual 
 
 199.  PatientsLikeMe FAQ, PATIENTSLIKEME, 
http://www.patientslikeme.com/help/faq/Corporate (“Except for the restricted personal 
information you entered when registering for the site, you should expect that every piece of 
information you submit (even if it is not currently displayed) may be shared with our partners 
and any member of PatientsLikeMe, including other patients.”).  
 200.  Julia Angwin & Steve Stecklow, ‘Scrapers’ Dig Deep for Data on Web, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 11, 2010, 9:30 p.m.), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703358504575544381288117888.html. 
 201.  Terhune, supra note 152 (“Two-thirds of all health insurers are using prescription 
data—not only to deny coverage to individuals and families but also to charge some customers 
higher premiums or exclude certain medical conditions from policies, according to agents and 
others in the industry.”). 
 202.  Uninsured people like the Sheltons can count on some help from the Affordable 
Care Act, the landmark legislation passed in 2010. That law will require insurers to guarantee 
issue of policies. They can still charge people in their 50s three times as much as they charge 
those in their 20s, but those with a prescription history will not have to worry about flat 
rejections. PPACA §§ 1201(4), 2702(a)–(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1(a)–(b)(1) (West Supp. 
1A 2010) (requiring acceptance of all applicants, but allowing limitation to certain “open or 
special enrollment” periods); PPACA §§ 1201, 2701(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(1)(A) 
(permitting 3 to 1 age-based pricing differentials). They will, however, want to think about 
how data brokers’ other forms of categorization may inform other, subtler forms of risk 
selection by employers and insurers. 
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insurance market.203 Insurers tailored policies to exclude pre-existing conditions 
or to charge some members more. Companies gathered millions of records from 
pharmacies, avoiding privacy restrictions on hospital and physician records.204 
They then sold them on to insurers eager to gain a competitive advantage by 
avoiding the sick. (Insurers may have “asked” applicants for insurance consent 
to the revelation of the data, revealing another perennial “weak spot” in privacy 
protections: “Consent” can be a near-universal solvent of extant protections, 
particularly if, say, all providers in a given sector require individuals to “consent” 
to review of health records in exchange for service.) Since 1% of patients account 
for over one fifth of healthcare costs, and 5% account for nearly half of costs, an 
insurer who can “cherry pick” the healthy and “lemon drop” the sick will be far 
more profitable than those who take all comers.205 Even though PPACA’s 
guaranteed issue provisions and exchanges will help deter such underwriting 
practices, it is by no means clear that health reform can address all the varied 
ways in which insurers can try to shift high-risk individuals to undesirable plans 
or self-insured employers can adopt pretextual tactics to drive them away as 
employees. 
The FTC is supposed to deter “unfair and deceptive” trade practices, 
particularly those that can harm consumer reputations. The FTC determined that 
MedPoint and Intelliscript had violated the law by keeping their systems secret 
from consumers. But the agency barely put a dent in their business practices. The 
FTC merely required that the prescription data brokers tell consumers if their file 
caused a denial of coverage or other adverse action. There is no privacy here, 
just a chance at ensuring accuracy: All the consumer can do in response is review 
the record and try to correct it if it is wrong.206 
 
 203.  Terhune, supra note 152. 
 204.  Complaint, In re Milliman (F.T.C. Feb, 12, 2008) (No. C-4213), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/062-3189/milliman-inc-matter. Less 
harmful uses of the information may also be troubling to consumers, or may end up going 
beyond their original purposes. For instance, Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 217 
(Mass. Superior Ct. 1999), addressed concerns about a pharmacy selling contact information 
of customers to allow a direct marketer to target customers with specific medical conditions). 
 205.  William W. Yu & Trena M. Ezzati-Rice, Concentration of Health Care Expenses in 
the U.S. Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND 
QUALITY (2005), 
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_files/publications/st81/stat81.shtml.  
 206.  See Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Milliman (F.T.C. Sep. 17, 2007) 
(No. C-4213), available at http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/062-
3189/milliman-inc-matter; Decision and Order, In re Milliman (F.T.C. Feb. 12, 2008) (No. C-
4213), available at http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/062-3189/milliman-
inc-matter; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, In re Milliman 
(F.T.C. Sep. 17, 2007) (No. C-4213), available at http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/062-3189/milliman-inc-matter; Complaint, In re Milliman (F.T.C. Feb. 12, 2008) 
(No. C-4213), available at http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/062-
3189/milliman-inc-matter; Medpoint Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Milliman 
(F.T.C. Feb. 12, 2008) (No. C-4213), available at http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/062-3189/milliman-inc-matter. 
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Meanwhile, data brokers quietly continue gathering information and making 
predictions based on it.207 Algorithmic predictions about health risks, based on 
information that individuals share with mobile apps about their caloric intake, 
may soon result in various penalties and missed opportunities.208 MedPoint and 
Intelliscript developed methods of estimating the likely cost of claims of an 
insured person, expressed as a numerical score. That opinion could be very 
valuable to lenders, employers, and just about any other entity with a stake in a 
person’s future. But the companies are under no obligation to disclose how it is 
computed. It is numbers like these and concomitant risk assessments and denials 
of opportunity that will matter to the twenty-first century health data subject just 
as much as opportunities to track and understand health data flows. 
Employers want healthy employees for many reasons, ranging from 
maximizing productivity to minimizing health care costs.209 Whatever their 
ethical commitments, data-driven managers will be tempted to avoid hiring the 
unhealthy unless very strong laws, persistent monitoring, and harsh enforcement 
penalties deter such behavior. Sharona Hoffman has predicted the growing use 
of “complex scoring algorithms based on electronic health records to determine 
which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-cost workers.”210 These 
methods are already used in life insurance.211 Moreover, companies can skip 
covered health records altogether and use other medically inflected data to 
predict an employee’s overall vitality or productivity. For example, a wide waist 
or multiple visits to Coca Cola websites could reflect a predisposition to diabetes. 
While anti-discrimination laws militate against decisions based on such data, it 
 
 207.  Sarah Ludington, supra note 152, at 162. There are also legitimate worries about 
discriminatory uses of information either not covered by extant privacy or anti-discrimination 
laws, or undetectable by workers. Hoffman, Employing E-Health, supra note 193, at 422 
(raising the possibility of a growing use of “complex scoring algorithms based on EHRs to 
determine which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-cost workers”). 
208.  Alice E. Marwick, How Your Data Are Being Deeply Mined, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 
Jan. 9, 2014, at 22. 
 209.  As Ann Marie Marciarille observes, “an estimated 59% of private sector workers 
with health coverage are enrolled in self-insured plans (up from 41% in 1998).” Marciarille, 
Self-Insurance Among Small Employers Under the ACA, MISSOURI STATE OF MIND (Feb.  18, 
2013), http://delong.typepad.com/annmariemarciarille/2013/02/self-insurance-by-small-
employers-under-the-aca.html. Self-insured status has become popular for many reasons; for 
example, the self-insured employer can more easily avoid state insurance regulation because 
of ERISA preemption. Barry R. Furrow et al., HEALTH LAW (revised 6th ed. 2008). Though 
many of these companies buy stop-loss insurance to mitigate their own risks, even if they are 
very well-insured in that respect, productivity losses due to illness (and particularly chronic 
illness) are well-documented. 
 210.  Hoffman, Employing E-Health, supra note 193, at 422. 
 211.  Frank Pasquale, Online Health Data in Employers’ and Insurers’ Predictive 
Analytics, CONCURRING OPINIONS, Nov. 19, 2010, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/11/online-health-data-in-employers-and-
insurers-predictive-analytics.html (“Did you know that buying generics instead of brands 
could hurt your credit? Or that a subscription to Hang Gliding Monthly could scare off life 
insurers? Or that certain employers’ access to electronic health records could lead them to 
classify you as ‘high-risk’ or ’high-cost’?”). 
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is increasingly difficult for those affected to understand (let alone prove) how 
health-inflected data affected decision-making about them. 
This is in part because the amount of data gathered by third and fourth party 
entities is immense; the inferences they enable are even more staggering. Data 
miners need not ask a person directly about clothing sizes; they might merely 
keep track of whether he visits a “big & tall” clothing store, on- or offline.212 So 
many online activities have some implications about a person’s health status that 
access to medical records is not necessary to construct a medical reputation.213 
Harvest enough data about the food consumers buy, how often they go to the 
gym, the size of their clothing, their educational attainment and interests, and 
“big data” mavens will be happy to predict their likely health outcomes. 
After the FTC’s intervention, consumers now should be able to locate and 
correct errant pharmacy record files. But consumer protection agencies have 
nowhere near the staff they would need to monitor all companies trafficking in 
reputational data. Unattributed data sources are used to make critical judgments 
about individuals.214 
  
 
 212.  See Duhigg, supra note 186 (“Almost every major retailer, from grocery chains to 
investment banks to the U.S. Postal Service, has a “predictive analytics” department devoted 
to understanding not just consumers’ shopping habits but also their personal habits, so as to 
more efficiently market to them.”).  
 213.  Just as life insurers dig into subscription records to find out if an applicant subscribes 
to Hang Gliding Monthly or Cigar Aficionado, employers are going to want to know more 
intimate details of employees’ lives, especially as the cost of data and its analysis declines. 
 214.  FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS BEHIND 
MONEY AND INFORMATION 35 (forthcoming 2015). 
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III.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Increasing Business Associate Compliance: Mandatory Business 
Associate Agreement Terms, Education, and Increased Enforcement 
Although the Omnibus HIPAA Rule gives teeth to HIPAA by extending 
liability down the chain, many cloud service providers have been unwilling or 
unable to accept the implications of HHS’s enforcement authority. This issue 
should be a priority for regulators, particularly as they implement audits for CEs 
and BAs215 and consider expanding the program.216 
A chorus of legal advisories agrees that the Omnibus HIPAA Rule reaches 
many cloud service providers. David Holtzman of OCR’s Health Information 
Privacy Division, for example, has warned CEs, “‘If you use a cloud service, it 
should be your business associate. If they refuse to sign a business associate 
agreement, don’t use the cloud service.”217 Advice abounds as to what BAAs 
 
 215.  Audit authority is described at 42 U.S.C. § 17940 (2009) (“The Secretary shall 
provide for periodic audits to ensure that covered entities and business associates that are 
subject to the requirements of this subtitle and subparts C and E of part 164 of title 45, Code 
of Federal Regulations, as such provisions are in effect as of the date of enactment of this Act, 
comply with such requirements”). To monitor covered entities to assure they are complying 
by HIPAA requirements, OCR launched an audit program in November 2011 as part of its 
health information privacy and security compliance program.  
 216.  Business associates were “immune from audit selection during the 2012 pilot phase, 
but this is expected to change should OCR expand the program in 2013, as HITECH explicitly 
subjects business associates to the HIPAA audits as well.” Richard B. Wagner, Early Results 
from New HIPAA Audit Pilot Reveal Emphasis on Policy Documentation and Business 
Associate Agreements, ABA HEALTH eSOURCE (May 2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/aba_health_l
aw_esource_0512_wagner.html. See generally Kendra Casey Plank, Permanent HIPAA Audit 
Program Will Focus on High-Risk Vulnerabilities, Officials Say, 5 HEALTH I.T. REP. (BNA) 8 
(Apr. 29, 2013) (reporting that OCR’s permanent audit program will need to be more targeted, 
due to financial constraints, and thus likely will focus on particularly high-risk activities and 
compliance, such as data breaches and CEs’ failure to adequately assess data security risks, 
which pose the biggest risk of harm to individuals). 
 217.  Spencer & Wagner, supra note 140; see also Art Gross, HIPAA Omnibus and 
Microsoft Office 365 (Feb. 16, 2013), http://www.hipaasecurenow.com/index.php/hipaa-
omnibus-and-microsoft-office-365/ (“If the CE is using Cloud Providers such as Google, 
Yahoo or AOL and they are sending PHI, then the Cloud Provider would be considered a 
HIPAA Business Associate. As a Business Associate, each of the Cloud Providers would be 
required to sign a HIPAA Business Associate Agreement (BAA) with the CE.”); Bianchi et 
al., supra note 51 (“OCR has made it clear that cloud vendors are business associates, even if 
they do not access PHI. This analysis is important as cloud-based solutions become more 
widespread in the health care industry.”); Attorney: HIPAA Rules Change Game for Cloud 
Companies, HEALTH DATA MANAGEMENT (Mar. 21, 2013) 
http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/issues/21_3/Attorney-HIPAA-Rules-Change-Game-
for-Cloud-Companies-45749-1.html (“Many cloud companies have taken the view that they 
are not business associates under HIPAA, but some of them now will be . . . . [A] company 
that maintains data is a BA even if it doesn’t access the data. I think that will have implications 
for the cloud industry” (quoting Robert Belfort, partner in the health care practice at law firm 
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips).) 
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with cloud service providers should include to minimize risks of HIPAA liability 
and ensure HIPAA compliance, such as elements to permit a risk assessment and 
risk management process.218 
Yet subsequent to HHS’s release of the final Omnibus HIPAA Rule in 
January 2013, some of the most powerful cloud service providers at least initially 
refused to execute BAAs with CEs or BAs.  Art Gross reported in February 2013 
that cloud service providers Google, Yahoo, and AOL were not willing to sign a 
BAA with a CE.219 There were reports that many cloud service providers did not 
believe that they were bound by HIPAA.220 Others may have felt free to ignore 
 
 218.  See, e.g., Spencer & Wagner, supra note 140 (itemizing what, at minimum, a 
HIPAA-compliant BAA between a CE and cloud computing entity should include “to obtain[] 
the operational and cost efficiencies of cloud computing, but, to help avoid the risk of a costly 
HIPAA violation”); Alex Ruoff, Data Security Should Be High Priority For Cloud Storage 
Users, White Paper Says, BNA HEALTH IT LAW & INDUSTRY REPORT (Jan. 7, 2013) 
(identifying elements of a proper risk assessment and risk management process what should 
be addressed when entering a BAA with a cloud vendor to mitigate liability, as outlined in a 
white paper by Foley & Lardner LLP); Alex Ruoff, OCR Could Include Cloud Provision In 
Forthcoming Omnibus HIPAA Rule, BNA HEALTH IT LAW & INDUSTRY REPORT (Jan. 7, 2013) 
(describing call for guidance from Deborah Peel, founder of Patient Privacy Rights, “that 
highlights the lessons learned from the Phoenix Cardiac Surgery case while making clear that 
HIPAA does not prevent providers from moving to the cloud,” including “request for technical 
safeguards for cloud computing solutions, such as risk assessments of and auditing controls 
for cloud-based health information technologies; security standards that establish the use and 
disclosure of individually identifiable information stored on clouds; and requirements for 
cloud solution providers and covered entities to enter into a business associate agreement 
outlining the terms of use for health information managed by the cloud provider”); Reece 
Hirsch, BNA Health IT Law & Industry Report, What Every General Counsel Should Know 
About Privacy and Security: 10 Trends for 2013 (Feb. 25, 2013) (summarizing opinion 
05/2012, guidance on cloud computing from the European Union Article 29 Working Group, 
advising “cloud customers to maximize oversight of cloud arrangements, recommending that 
cloud customers conduct a comprehensive data protection risk assessment before selecting a 
cloud provider . . . [and identifying] 14 specific issues that cloud customers should address in 
cloud service agreements”). 
 219.  Gross, supra note 217; see also Leyva, supra note 65 (opining that even though 
Google would be a business associate if a CE or BA uses a tool like Google Apps to store PHI, 
it is unlikely a company like Google would enter into the contract now required by the 
Omnibus HIPAA Rule). 
 220.  See, e.g., Belfort et al., supra note 63 (noting that HHS’s interpretation that vendors 
maintaining PHI are BAs even when they do not require routine access to PHI appears “to 
impose HIPAA requirements on certain cloud computing companies and other data storage 
vendors that previously took the position they were not business associates”); Patrick 
Ouellette, HIPAA Omnibus Responsibility Focus Shift: Legal Q&A, HEALTH SECURITY (Jan. 
22, 2013), http://healthitsecurity.com/2013/01/22/hipaa-omnibus-responsibility-focus-shift-
legal-qa/ (“Every subcontractor involved is going to have HIPAA Security Rule obligations 
and some of them may not even know it.”); Plank, Enforcement, Compliance, supra note 140 
(“But some attorneys have worried that subcontractors, who do work involving protected 
health information, will not realize they are now covered.”); Steve Swann, Analysis of the 
HIPAA Omnibus Rule, ANITIAN BLOG (Feb. 12, 2013), http://blog.anitian.com/?p=348 (“This 
means a lot of companies who do not think HIPAA applies to them, are now required to be 
HIPAA compliant.”). 
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HIPAA’s commands because enforcement seemed unlikely.221 
 
When cloud service providers do enter contracts with CEs or BAs, they often 
use their disproportionate bargaining power to insist that their customers “enter 
into standard, non-negotiable agreements,” particularly with “low value 
contracts and community cloud contracts.”222 One attorney who provides legal 
advice to a Fortune 100 company said that cloud service providers refuse to 
negotiate the terms of BAAs. At best they might offer to share the results of a 
third party audit. But such audits do not excuse the CE or BA from complying 
with HIPAA’s written contract requirement.223 
There is evidence that the market is reacting to the liability risks made plain 
by the Omnibus HIPAA Rule.224 Gradually, resistant cloud service providers 
appear to be rethinking their position on BAAs since they bear direct and 
potential agency liability for subcontractor BAs under the Rule.225 An Amazon 
Web Services (“AWS”) discussion thread documented this evolution. AWS, like 
many other cloud providers, reportedly had “previously taken the position that it 
is not required to sign BAAs with companies that run HIPAA applications and/or 
permanently store PHI on [Amazon Web Services].”226 A consumer initiated the 
 
 221.  Of course, as discussed below, not all cloud providers have refused to execute 
BAAs. Some understood and have been willing to comply with HIPAA’s requirements, 
including the requirement to sign a BAA. Melissa Markey observes that these cloud providers, 
which typically qualify for federal government contracts, tend to be more expensive, but they 
are “much cheaper than a breach response.” Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (May 2013) (on 
file with authors). As more and more cloud providers recognize that they need to be willing to 
execute BAAs because of HIPAA and/or market commands, prices should come down as well. 
 222.  Classen, supra note 6, at 21. 
 223.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Health Information Privacy: 
FAQ (last updated Mar. 14, 2006), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq/business_associates/237.html (“Instead of entering 
into a contract, can business associates self-certify or be certified by a third party as compliant 
with the HIPAA Privacy Rule? Answer: No. A covered entity is required to enter into a 
contract or other written arrangement with a business associate that meets the requirements at 
45 CFR 164.504(e).”); see also David Kidd, What Does It Take to Be HIPAA-Compliant in 
the Cloud?, THE DATA CENTER J. (Feb. 25, 2013), 
http://www.datacenterjournal.com/it/hipaacompliant-cloud/ (“Many technology companies 
are announcing the availability of their HIPAA-compliant cloud solutions, and it is important 
for health-care companies to understand what such a solution entrails [sic]. Employing these 
solutions does not mean the customer is no longer responsible for meeting specific HIPAA 
requirements for their applications, data and IT infrastructure. In fact, some HIPAA 
requirements will always be the sole responsibility of the customer, not the cloud provider.”). 
224.  Cf. Gross, supra note 217 (“Microsoft has built a very affordable, HIPAA compliant 
cloud service and is clearly aiming at CEs of all sizes. It will be interesting to see how 
Google, Yahoo and AOL respond. How long Microsoft enjoys the only HIPAA compliant 
cloud service niche is still left to be seen.”). 
 225.  See Proskauer, supra note 126; Plank, Enforcement, Compliance, supra note 140.  
 226.  rudi2001, Comment to HIPAA BAA Agreement, Omnibus Rules New As of Jan 2013, 
AMAZON WEB SERVICES DISCUSSION FORUMS (Feb. 6, 2013), 
https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=428426. AWS is Amazon’s cloud 
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public discussion thread to ask AWS if it had reconsidered its policy in the wake 
of the Omnibus HIPAA Rule. Others quickly joined the chorus of curious current 
and potential clients. A post from a prospective business client noted that HIPAA 
compliance was “the single show-stopping item that is preventing my company 
from moving all our infrastructure to AWS.”227 Another indicated that he was 
pursuing alternatives with a competitor who would enter a BAA with it because 
it has “a responsibility to remain compliant.”228 One poster went a step further 
by providing a link to Microsoft Azure, which reportedly was willing to execute 
BAAs.229 Despite these posts, it took AWS three weeks just to post the 
unsatisfying response that it was “in the process of considering the impact of [the 
Omnibus] rule to AWS.”230  
 
While Amazon was considering its position, additional posts noted that 
Verizon, Dell, Box, ClearDATA, Online Tech, Rackspace, and several other 
unnamed cloud providers were now willing to execute BAAs.231 As one poster 
noted, “competition is heating up fast[,] and literally dozens of cloud providers 
are popping up with HIPAA compliant comparable offerings and are more than 
willing to sign the BAA.”232 This same poster claimed that his business “could 
 
computing service. 
 227.  eatscrayons, Comment to HIPAA BAA Agreement, Omnibus Rules New As of Jan 
2013, AMAZON WEB SERVICES DISCUSSION FORUMS (Feb. 6, 2013), 
https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=428426. 
 228.  amht3, Comment to HIPAA BAA Agreement, Omnibus Rules New As of Jan 2013, 
AMAZON WEB SERVICES DISCUSSION FORUMS (Feb. 12, 2013), 
https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=428426. This post suggests that 
perhaps some of the negotiation imbalance may be starting to self-correct. 
 229.  ddubyap, Comment to HIPAA BAA Agreement, Omnibus Rules New As of Jan 2013, 
AMAZON WEB SERVICES DISCUSSION FORUMS (Feb. 27, 2013), 
https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=428426. See also Gross, supra note 
217 (reporting that Microsoft would sign a BAA with a CE that uses the Microsoft Office 365 
platform, “a cloud solution that provides email, instant messaging, calendaring, file and data 
storage, etc.”). 
 230.  rudi2001, Amazon Web Services Discussion Forums, supra note 226. 
 231. Richard Boyde, Comment to HIPAA BAA Agreement, Omnibus Rules New As of 
Jan 2013, AMAZON WEB SERVICES DISCUSSION FORUMS (May 2, 2013), 
https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=428426. Dan Munro, Comment to 
HIPAA BAA Agreement, Omnibus Rules New As of Jan 2013, AMAZON WEB SERVICES 
DISCUSSION FORUMS (May 2, 2013), 
https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=428426; vitalreactor Comment to 
HIPAA BAA Agreement, Omnibus Rules New As of Jan 2013, AMAZON WEB SERVICES 
DISCUSSION FORUMS (May 9, 2013), 
https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=428426; MPMike2000 Comment to 
HIPAA BAA Agreement, Omnibus Rules New As of Jan 2013, AMAZON WEB SERVICES 
DISCUSSION FORUMS (May 11, 2013), 
https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=428426. 
232.  MPMike2000 Comment to HIPAA BAA Agreement, Omnibus Rules New As of Jan 
2013, AMAZON WEB SERVICES DISCUSSION FORUMS (May 16, 2013), 
https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=428426.  
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have netted Amazon tens of thousands of dollars in revenue per month for a 
variety of services,” but his legal team had advised him to migrate to Microsoft 
Azure.233  
On June 12, 2013, AWS finally announced through this discussion thread 
that it will sign BAAs as required by HIPAA.234 Google similarly began entering 
BAAs in fall 2013 and announced in February 2014 that it would support 
“customers who are subject to HIPAA regulations on Google Cloud 
Platform.”235 The tide seems to be turning.   
 
HHS should consider how it can help this evolution progress. Recognizing 
that cloud service providers often have a bargaining advantage vis-à-vis CEs or 
BAs, HHS could require that BAAs contain certain terms that some cloud service 
providers to date have resisted but that will enable CEs and BAs to evaluate 
whether cloud vendors are complying with HIPAA.236 For example, HHS could 
consider requiring BAAs to include certain security provisions, such as requiring 
cloud vendors to provide an audit certification that complies with the Statement 
on Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 16 Service Organization 
Control (SOC), Type II, or an equivalent audit;237 a summary of the vendor’s 
 
233.  MPMike2000 Comment to HIPAA BAA Agreement, Omnibus Rules New As of Jan 
2013, AMAZON WEB SERVICES DISCUSSION FORUMS (May 11, 2013), 
https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=428426  
234.  Oren@AWS Comment to HIPAA BAA Agreement, Omnibus Rules New As of Jan 
2013, AMAZON WEB SERVICES DISCUSSION FORUMS (June 12, 2013, 
https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=428426. 
235.  McCann, supra note 5. Mike Semel observed that although Google in September 
2013 began offering HIPAA BAAs to business that purchase premium Google Apps for 
Business cloud services, it is not doing the same for users of its free services: 
Google is NOT offering Business Associate Agreements to those using their 
FREE Gmail service. A medical or dental practice using free Gmail to send and 
receive electronic Protected Health Information is committing a HIPAA data 
breach because (a) Google will not sign a BAA and (b) Google’s terms and 
conditions allow them to share—even publish— anything in free Gmail. 
Mike Semel, HIPAA Business Associate Avoidance and Google Update, 4MED+APPROVED 
(Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.4medapproved.com/hitsecurity/google-update-hipaa-business-
associate-avoidance/; see also Paul Shukovsky, Medical School Notifies Patients of Breach 
Incident Arising From Data Stored in Cloud, 5 HEALTH I.T. REP. (BNA) 14 (Aug. 12, 2013) 
(reporting that Oregon Health & Science University had notified more than 3,000 patients in 
July 2013 that its residents had “created an ad hoc system of sharing health information 
stored in [a] Google cloud [spreadsheet],” even though Google is not a BA of the university, 
and that it was unclear if Google had accessed the data, given that its terms of service permit 
“stored data to be used for the ‘purpose of operating, promoting, and improving [its] 
Services, and to develop new ones’”).  
236.  Regina Faulkenberry has produced a useful practice resource that discusses a 
variety of contract terms that are important to consider in the cloud computing context. See 
Faulkenberry, supra note 5, at 119. Although not the focus of the article, HIPAA and 
HITECH requirements are discussed. 
 237.  For more information about SSAE 16 SOC 2, Type II audits, see MARKEY & 
MARCHAK, supra note 6, at 25-26. A clean SSAE 16 SOC 2, Type II audit provides a useful 
indication that the vendor takes seriously its security responsibilities. 
Winter 2014] PROTECTING HEALTH PRIVACY 643 
security plan; a summary of the disaster response and continuity of operations 
plan; an executive summary of a risk assessment performed at least annually and 
potentially whenever there are significant changes to the computing environment 
and/or there are new threats or vulnerabilities identified; and access for the 
security officer of the CE or BA to speak to the security officer of the cloud 
vendor.238 HHS also could consider when it may be appropriate to require a 
cloud vendor to grant access to its data center so the CE or upstream BA may 
examine the vendor’s physical security. Although it may go too far to require 
cloud vendors to permit CEs or upstream BAs to conduct remote scans of the 
cloud’s system, another option is to require the cloud vendor to agree to share a 
high level summary of the results of a penetration scan performed by a mutually 
agreeable, qualified, and authorized pen tester, which would yield similar 
information regarding the security of the cloud vendor.239 
HHS also could consider requiring a term in the BAA to apportion liability 
for HIPAA violations in accordance with each party’s responsibility. Several 
advisories have recommended that parties negotiate indemnification terms,240 
given the exposure to direct and agency liability contemplated by the Omnibus 
HIPAA Rule. Some vendors maintain that these terms no longer are appropriate 
because they are directly liable to HHS. But as attorneys Melissa Markey and 
Margaret Marchak have pointed out, direct liability of the cloud provider to HHS 
does not necessarily mean the CE will not be liable for a breach.241 If the cloud 
provider caused the breach, the CE may want “to require the business associate 
to protect the covered entity from costs and losses due to the failure of the 
business associate to comply with the agreement.”242 Despite the continued 
importance of indemnification clauses to cloud contracting, however, some CEs 
may lack sufficient bargaining power to extract (or may not know to ask for) 
such a clause from a cloud service provider. A requirement in the BAA for the 
parties to apportion liability between themselves based on fault arguably would 
give each party an incentive to comply with HIPAA to avoid liability. Such a 
clause, however, would not protect the parties from enforcement by HHS 
 
 238.  See id. at 23, 33; Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (May 2013) (on file with 
authors); Telephone Interview with Melissa Markey, Esq. (May 17, 2013) (notes on file with 
authors).  
 239.  See Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (May 2013) (on file with authors); Telephone 
Interview with Melissa Markey, Esq. (May 17, 2013) (notes on file with authors); See also 
MARKEY & MARCHAK, supra note 6, at 22-24. 
 240.  See, e.g., Proskauer, supra note 126 (recommending that “both covered entities and 
business associates should now consider seeking indemnification in their business associate 
agreements”); Anne Foster et al., supra note 133 (“Covered entities are encouraged to shore 
up their business associate agreements to include indemnification language and consider cyber 
liability insurance requirements when contracting with business associates.”). 
 241.  MARKEY & MARCHAK, supra note 6, at 4.  
 242.  Id. Ms. Markey also generally seeks to carve out HIPAA compliance from any 
limitations of liability. Telephone Interview with Melissa Markey, Esq. (May 17, 2013) (notes 
on file with authors); Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (May 2013) (on file with authors). 
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because HITECH and the Omnibus HIPAA Rule establish the liability of CEs 
and BAs.243 
HHS also can look for ways to educate CEs and cloud service providers of 
HIPAA’s reach, requirements, and penalties in the hope of increasing 
compliance. As Stephen Wu, a partner at Cooke Kobrick & Wu LLP, has noted, 
“If you don’t know you’re a business associate . . . you might not be taking all 
the steps you need to comply.”244 To this end, HHS’s Office of Civil Rights is 
designing online educational resources to help healthcare organizations and BAs 
comply with the Omnibus HIPAA Rule.245 These resources include: a breach 
risk assessment tool to help CEs and BAs assess if notification is required; 
guidance to help CEs comply with the minimum necessary standard when 
dealing with BAs and others; compliance tools focused on helping smaller 
healthcare entities; modified HIPAA training for state attorneys general that CEs 
may use; and consumer materials, such as YouTube videos and multilingual fact 
sheets that explain patient rights and other aspects of the Rule.246 HHS should 
expand these planned educational efforts by developing educational materials 
targeted to cloud service providers to help them understand their responsibilities 
and liability exposure under HIPAA. 
HHS should also work to empower CEs and upstream BAs with information 
about cloud provider liability and resources available to help them evaluate 
potential vendors from a security standpoint. According to Melissa Markey, CEs 
do not always appreciate that they have bargaining power and options such that 
they can walk away from cloud vendors who refuse to execute BAAs or provide 
any information about their security practices.247 Ms. Markey and Ms. Marchak 
reject vendors’ defense that they must keep their processes confidential to 
maintain security, retorting that, “security by obscurity is not a good policy.”248 
While some details of the security operations must remain confidential, they 
believe the security officers from the customer and vendor can share much 
information without jeopardizing security to “allow the customer to evaluate 
 
 243.  See, e.g., Spencer & Wagner, supra note 140 (“Although the parties can sign 
agreements and decide which entities will be financially responsible for certain activities, ‘you 
cannot avoid the federal government. Now that business associates are liable under statute, 
you can’t have a contract that says business associates are not liable for anything,’ [Joy] Pritts[, 
chief privacy officer at the HHS Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT,] said. If the 
federal government ‘decides the business associate was the one responsible, they still have the 
ability to enforce against the business associate,’ Pritts said.”); Foster et al., supra note 133 
(“Business associates cannot avoid regulatory liability by refusing to sign a business associate 
agreement or limiting liability in those agreements.”). 
 244.  Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, HIPAA Omnibus: The Liability Chain: Expert Explains 
Compliance Flow, HEALTHCARE INFO SECURITY (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.healthcareinfosecurity.com/interviews/hipaa-omnibus-liability-chain-i-1787. 
 245.  See McGee, HIPAA Omnibus Compliance, supra note 128. 
 246.  See id. 
 247.  See Telephone Interview with Melissa Markey, Esq. (May 17, 2013) (notes on file 
with authors). 
 248.  MARKEY & MARCHAK, supra note 6, at 24.  
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whether security is reasonable.”249 Education of all parties is critical to have 
meaningful negotiations. 
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Service’s (CMS) deployment of 
integrity contractors to address problems of errors in payments and claims may 
provide one model of education toward compliance if Congress is willing to 
authorize and provide initial investment in more calibrated interventions to 
assure compliance. CMS has pioneered innovative deployments of private sector 
contractors in social welfare programs.250 The agency has also employed a wide 
array of contractors to detect and deter improper payments.251 Perhaps HIPAA 
fines could be deployed in a similar way, to provide a sustainable ecosystem of 
self-funding to expert entities capable of monitoring a rapidly changing technical 
landscape. 
Truly assuring the privacy and security of data in the cloud may require 
intense and fine-grained surveillance. Just as “radical transparency” has changed 
the larger world of business,252 CMS’s new methods are motivating healthcare 
providers to modernize their practices.253 The mere threat of intense assessment 
of interventions can increase productivity. Work can be performed more 
efficiently as it is recorded and studied. New forms of regulation depend on rapid 
accumulation of data, and auditors should not shy away from benchmarking 
ideals for continuous quality improvement by cloud service providers.254 
 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  Sara Kay Wheeler et al., Meet the Fraud Busters: Program Safeguard Contractors 
and Zone Program Integrity Contractors, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 6 (2011) (citing 42 
C.F.R. §§ 421.100 (financial intermediaries), 421.200 (carriers), 421.210 (DMERCs), and 
describing the functions of each); see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., 
MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL § 1.3.6 (last updated Mar. 7, 2014); 42 C.F.R. § 
421.304 (describing the function of Medicare Integrity Program Contractors). 
 251.  Mark E. Reagan & Mark A. Johnson, Taming the Medicaid Beast: The Federal 
Government’s Ambitious Attempt to Combat Medicaid Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, 3 J. HEALTH 
& LIFE SCI. L. 1, 1 (2010) (explaining “the role and duties of the numerous Medicaid Integrity 
Contractors”). 
 252.  DAVID TICOLL & DON TAPSCOTT, THE NAKED CORPORATION: HOW THE AGE OF 
TRANSPARENCY WILL REVOLUTIONIZE BUSINESS 1-6 (2003) (describing openness as a business 
imperative).  
 253.  The Recovery Audit Contractor Program was created by the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 to recover Medicare overpayments under fee-for-service Medicare 
Plans. In 2006, the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, made the 
program permanent and required implementation in all states by 2010. During the 
demonstration program that ran from 2005 to 2008, the RAC program had identified 
approximately $992.7 million of improper overpayments for CMS. Press Release, Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, New Report Shows CMS Pilot Program Saving Nearly $700 
Million in Improper Medicare Payments, (July 11, 2008) available at 
http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/2008-Press-releases-
items/2008-07-11.html. As the authority, functions, and objectives of contractors differ, 
providers are advised to “develop unique plans for communicating and interacting with each 
contractor to minimize the risk of sanctions for alleged noncompliance.” Wheeler et al., supra 
note 250, at 7.  
 254.  Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a 
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It may be possible to attribute some of cloud vendors’ recalcitrance to the 
relatively low number of enforcement actions brought against CEs and BAs. 
Many penalty actions originate from CEs that self-reported breaches while those 
who flout the regulatory system remain untouched. This creates a regrettable 
disincentive for compliance. HHS should exercise its power to conduct audits 
over cloud service providers to root out noncompliance and hopefully encourage 
a culture of compliance. Given resource constraints that might limit efforts to 
increase federal HIPAA enforcement, HHS also could study whether the States 
could be better incentivized to assist with HIPAA enforcement.255 
B. Study Assessing Feasibility of Limited Safe Harbor for Covered 
Entities Engaged in Best Practices 
It seems like sound policy to encourage upstream HIPAA entities to provide 
guidance and supervision to downstream entities. There are several reasons, 
however, that CEs or BAs contracting with cloud service providers might not 
exercise this supervisory role. 
For one, as discussed in Section IV.A.1, supra, cloud service providers enjoy 
strong bargaining power and thus sometimes demand that CEs and upstream BAs 
sign form contracts. It is unlikely cloud service providers will volunteer to be 
controlled and directed during their performance under the BAA, opting instead 
for independence and flexibility. HHS could address the bargaining power 
disparity and encourage downstream supervision by requiring BAAs to include 
terms that preserve a monitoring role for CEs and upstream BAs. 
Even without the bargaining imbalance, a CE or BA may be reluctant to 
reserve the right or authority to control a downstream BA’s conduct256 for fear 
of being held liable for the agent’s violations even though the CE or BA lacks 
any real ability to control the agent’s behavior. HHS expressed its understanding 
in the preamble to the Omnibus HIPAA Rule that a BA could still be acting 
within the scope of agency if it deviated from the terms of the BAA by, for 
example, acting carelessly, making a mistake, or disregarding the CE or upstream 
BA’s specific instruction.257 Thus, it appears that although agency liability 
requires the principal to have the authority to control the BA’s conduct by, for 
example, being able to give instructions during the course of the agent’s 
performance of the service, agency liability does not necessarily lapse when the 
 
Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 670, 694 (2012).  
 255.  Unfortunately, despite some notable action against an accretive breach in 
Minnesota, other states have not been that active in utilizing newfound authority under 
HITECH. Kimberley Leonard, State Attorneys General Not Leaping to Embrace HIPAA 
Enforcement, THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 20, 2011, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/09/20/6666/state-attorneys-general-not-leaping-
embrace-hipaa-enforcement.  
 256.  Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 45, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5581. 
 257.  See id. at 5582. But cf. id. at 5587 (“An agent that fails to notify a covered entity or 
business associate may be acting outside its scope of authority as an agent.”). 
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agent does not heed the principal’s instructions. A CE or BA may not want to 
retain the appearance of control yet risk that it will be liable for a sloppy or 
perhaps even rogue agent’s violations. It would be helpful for HHS to expand on 
its discussion in the preamble to the Omnibus HIPAA Rule as to when a CE or 
upstream BA would remain liable for the violations of an agent that disregards 
the principal’s instructions or otherwise violates the BAA. 
Moreover, given the technical complexities of cloud computing, it would be 
valuable for HHS to focus more attention on regulating cloud providers more 
directly. The nascent auditing of BAs discussed elsewhere in this Article may 
provide one model. HHS also ought to clarify to what extent agency liability 
applies in the cloud computing context. The Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule 
Preamble emphasizes that agency liability is a fact sensitive inquiry that depends 
on the type of service and skill level required to perform the service.258 HHS 
expressed its doubt, for example, that a small provider would have sufficient 
expertise to supervise and direct a company hired to de-identify PHI.259 It is 
unclear how this analysis applies in the cloud computing context. It is possible 
that at least some cloud computing services require expertise CEs and upstream 
BAs lack such that the cloud service provider is not the agent of the CE or BA. 
But this analysis depends on the particular service the cloud service provider is 
performing as well as the skill set and expertise of the CE or upstream BA. In 
addition, since a CE or BA does not need to retain the right or authority to control 
every aspect of a downstream BA’s activities to create agency liability,260 
perhaps HHS will take the position that, despite cloud expertise, CEs and BAs 
can and should supervise downstream cloud BAs, at least with respect to risk 
management and HIPAA compliance. CEs and BAs would benefit from 
additional guidance from HHS regarding whether cloud service providers are or 
can be agents of CEs or upstream BAs despite potential gaps in technical 
sophistication. 
To the extent agency liability applies to cloud service provider relationships, 
HHS could study the feasibility of creating a limited safe harbor for CEs and 
upstream BAs who engage in guidance and vetting of downstream BAs. 
Recognizing that HHS recently omitted from the Omnibus HIPAA Rule a 
previous exception to agency liability for CEs,261 this limited safe harbor could 
not be an end run around agency liability. Rather, a limited safe harbor would 
need to go beyond the elements of the liability exception HHS rejected. For 
example, in addition to complying with the pertinent BAA and HIPAA 
requirements and not being aware of a pattern or practice of the BA violating the 
contract, CEs and upstream BAs would need to actively engage in evaluating, 
educating, monitoring, and providing feedback to downstream BAs with the goal 
 
 258.  Id. at 5581. 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Id. at 5582. 
 261.  Id. at 5580; Swann, supra note 57. 
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of raising awareness of and sensitivity to the need to protect PHI. A number of 
the security provisions itemized in Section IV.A, supra, could facilitate the 
vetting and monitoring HHS wants to encourage, such as requiring an SSAE 16 
SOC, Type II audit and access to the cloud vendor’s security officer for technical 
level discussions about its security practices.262 To encourage due diligence and 
vigilance, HHS could distinguish supervising from exercising control. Thus, 
guidance could clarify that being more aware of how a cloud vendor approaches 
security and confirming that it has a clean audit before engaging in business with 
that vendor, for example, as distinguished from retaining control to direct vendor 
actions on a day-to-day basis, will not create agency liability. 
Alternatively, in determining how to exercise its discretion both to bring 
enforcement actions and to set penalties, HHS could issue guidance clarifying 
that it will take into consideration the relative bargaining power of the parties 
and the extent to which CEs or upstream BAs took steps to assess risks and take 
appropriate steps to preserve PHI. For example, HHS could affirm the value of 
CEs and upstream BAs vetting potential vendors prior to contracting to evaluate 
their qualifications and compliance with HIPAA; using a BAA that includes all 
terms required by HHS; actively monitoring the agent’s performance; providing 
appropriate and ongoing training and instruction to cloud service providers; and 
 
 262.  See MARKEY & MARCHAK, supra note 6, at 23, 33. Markey & Marchak offer a useful 
list of questions to consider asking as part of the due diligence required to assess a cloud 
vendor’s approach to security: 
What security measures are in place to protect the data center against unauthorized physical 
intrusion? 
Who would be permitted to access my data and under what circumstances? 
What are your procedures for terminating access to data or systems upon termination of an 
employee, or upon change of job duties? 
What are the processes to ensure that default passwords are changed and/or other access 
controls are implemented? 
What procedures exist to ensure configurations are properly set? 
What does your testing/patch process include? 
What is your encryption policy? 
How do you secure transmissions outside your network? 
Where will the data be stored? In the United States or other countries? 
Does the cloud provider: 
Have cyber-insurance? 
Have an audit certification of their information security program in compliance with the 
Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 16 Service Organization 
Control (SOC) 2 or 3, or equivalent audit (e.g. ISO 27001/2)? 
Conduct (at a minimum) quarterly vulnerability scans and annual network penetration tests? 
Use security monitoring and event log management to ensure the collection and secure storage 
of audit trails? 
Review event logs periodically for anomalies?  
Document changes following industry standard practices for configuration management and 
change control? 
Employ redundant hardware components, load-balanced Internet connections with multiple 
service providers, and functioning firewalls? 
Implement backup options and encrypt any removable or portable backup media? 
Conduct business continuity and disaster recovery exercises on a regular, planned basis?  
Id. at 22-24. 
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responding to signals of possible violations.263 
C.  Increasing Patient Empowerment: From Transparency to Intelligibility 
to Accountability 
Expanding access to personal information is part of a larger movement to 
hold corporate actors accountable in an era of rapidly declining data storage 
costs. Asked about privacy practices, Google’s former CEO Eric Schmidt once 
said, “[W]e like to get right up to the creepy line, but not cross it.”264 But it would 
probably be more accurate to say that he and other corporate leaders do not want 
to be caught crossing the creepy line. Law and technology provide a rich variety 
of tactics to avoid that possibility. Accountings of disclosures should provide a 
persistent record of data use that should deter at least some privacy violations, if 
they are regularly audited by some expert and objective entity.265 
Many aspects of the Omnibus HIPAA Rule are aimed at assuring that 
patients are able to understand data kept about them by CEs and BAs. While the 
Rule makes several steps in the right direction, it does not reflect a full 
appreciation of the levels of complexity in data flows occasioned by 
technological advance. Standards and best practices still need to be adopted by 
the larger cloud computing community to assure a full appreciation of data flows. 
For example, how well can records interact with data visualization tools?266 
 
 263. See generally Kendra Casey Plank, Permanent HIPAA Audit Program Will Focus on 
High-Risk Vulnerabilities, Officials Say, 5 HEALTH I.T. REP. (BNA) 8 (Apr. 29, 2013) 
(reporting that OCR Director Leon Rodriquez said that “OCR would look for ‘conscientious’ 
efforts by covered entities to assess data security risks, develop mitigation strategies, train 
employees on Privacy Rule obligations, and generally comply with HIPAA rules to guide 
enforcement activities and corrective actions”); cf. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 57-62 (Nov. 14, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf (itemizing ten 
hallmarks of effective compliance programs that DOJ and SEC take into consideration in 
deciding whether to take enforcement action against a company and what penalty to impose: 
commitment from senior management and clearly articulated policy against corruption; code 
of conduct and compliance policies and procedures; oversight, autonomy, and resources; risk 
assessment; training and continuing advice; incentives and disciplinary measures; third party 
due diligence and payments; confidential reporting and internal investigation; continuous 
improvement: periodic testing and review; mergers and acquisitions: pre-acquisition due 
diligence and post-acquisition integration).  
 264.  Derek Thompson, Google’s CEO: ‘The Laws Are Written by Lobbyists’, ATLANTIC 
ONLINE (Oct. 1, 2010, 11:58 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/10/googles-ceo-the-laws-are-written-
by-lobbyists/63908/. 
 265.  See HIPAA Privacy Rule Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 159 (pointing 
out that audit trails “discourage inappropriate behavior”). 
 266.  Gary Kovacs has promoted Collusion as an app to track app data sharing; Latanya 
Sweeney has focused “The Data Map” on health issues. Latanya Sweeney, THE DATA MAP 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2014), http://thedatamap.org/intro.html (“When you visit a doctor, you 
expect some organizations to receive information about your visit (e.g., your medical 
insurance company and your pharmacy), but you might be surprised and not even recognize 
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Fuller interoperability and more open APIs will be necessary in order to 
empower consumers to fully understand how data flows and how those flows 
influence their opportunities. 
Nor did Congress adequately appreciate, in HITECH, the degree to which 
big data companies’ use of health-inflected data could eventually render HIPAA 
irrelevant by fueling the creation of medical reputations unmoored from covered 
medical records. In order to address these twenty-first century challenges to 
health privacy, policymakers should take two steps: rendering existing data about 
information practices more intelligible to consumers, and presenting in plain 
terms to Congress the types of privacy challenges enabled by the deployment of 
big data. 
Over a decade ago, Bill Sage complained that both supporters and critics of 
information-based regulation in healthcare “have overlooked serious operational 
issues and misunderstood some of the best uses of information.”267 Sage argued 
that disclosure must be “properly designed and implemented” to improve 
outcomes, and he worried that the disclosure movement of the 1990s was ill-
equipped to provide actionable information to patients and providers.268 Sage’s 
concerns appear especially relevant in the realm of health privacy, where the 
proliferation of entities with some interest in and access to health records is far 
outpacing the ability of conventional notices and written descriptions to convey 
information to patients. 
As HHS continues clarifying the implications of the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, 
it should focus on moving from transparency to intelligibility in health data. 
Rather than merely opening up presently maintained information, policymakers 
need to focus on promoting the types of standards and analysis that can make 
that data actionable. This will require careful collaboration between regulators, 
technical experts, and data visualization and design experts who have studied 
optimal communication strategies. 
The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) 
warned in 2010 against health information technology adoption uninspired by a 
vision for data use and sharing that would allow healthcare to enjoy the quality 
and efficiency gains characteristic of information industries.269 It is now time to 
take the next step and consider how high technology approaches could also 
promote privacy in healthcare. In this respect, the Federal Trade Commission, 
often seen as the lead privacy regulator in the U.S. (and an entity with some role 
 
many of the other entities who may also receive identifiable information about your visit (e.g., 
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in health privacy given its statutory authority to regulate personal health records), 
offers both lessons and a cautionary tale. 
Realizing how quickly the world of online data collection is moving, the 
FTC has taken important steps to monitor evolving business practices. The 
agency appointed Ed Felten as “Chief Technologist,” and has also employed 
highly regarded privacy experts like Paul Ohm and Christopher Soghoian. 
Soghoian and Felten have extensive experience in computer science; Ohm 
combines computer science training with legal expertise. Each of these 
individuals has done a great deal to help the agency apply expertise to current 
problems in privacy. Moreover, the agency’s report, Protecting Consumer 
Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and 
Policymakers, was a model of sensitive appreciation of stakeholder concerns, 
leading to guidance on some best practices for digital companies. 
This perceptive, well-written report grappled with fundamental issues in the 
law of fair data practices and consumer protection. Where the law was plainly 
inadequate, the report said so. For example, it supported “legislation that would 
provide consumers with access to information held by data brokers,” an 
increasingly important priority in a pervasively scored society.270 The FTC’s 
December 2012 subpoena of leading data brokers indicates an interest in 
illuminating some of the darker corners of data collection, analysis, sharing, and 
use. The FTC’s commitment to technical personnel and cutting edge reports is 
something of a model for other agencies tasked with protecting privacy in an era 
of rapid change. 
Nevertheless, there are also faults in the FTC’s approach. Peter Maass’s 
investigative report for ProPublica called the agency hopelessly outmatched in 
terms of staffing vis-à-vis the extraordinary proliferation of data-driven business 
models it is ostensibly policing.271 Echoing the 1968 Nader Report on the FTC, 
Maass described the near-heroic (but ultimately doomed) efforts of a chronically 
underfunded entity to keep up with privacy threats in the new economy. Sadly, 
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top officials at the agency were more defensive than supportive of Maass’s 
characterization of the impossible task Congress had set for them given the 
resources allocated. Where its technical capacity is clearly lacking, it should say 
so. And it should not be afraid to ask Congress for the resources it needs to detect 
lawbreaking. This might include a self-funding agency model, like the Patent and 
Trademark Office, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or the FDIC.272 
Or it could ask for authorization to hire contractors to discover wrongdoing, 
paying them on a contingency basis. All of these approaches should be 
considered by agencies tasked with protecting health privacy, lest their mission 
shrink to fit whatever inadequate resources happen to be allocated to them in any 
particular budget cycle. 
Finally, regulators (probably at the state level) need to address the heart of 
the matter: misuses of data.  As data use intensifies, it will be hard for persons 
(even with the aid of new software and professional help) to keep track of exactly 
where and how they’re being characterized. And in many contexts, even 
accurate, true data can be unfairly or discriminatorily deployed. For example, 
consider the credit card company that codes payments to marriage counselors as 
a harbinger of default (and raises cardholders’ interest rates accordingly). In a 
just world, medical conditions (or decisions to seek treatment for them) would 
not influence decisions on terms of credit. It is not fair to compound the misery 
of illness with spiked interest rates.  
We already forbid the use of genetic information in employment decisions 
because a person cannot control the genes they are born with. But note how far 
any individual is from responsibility for many ordinary illnesses. Sickness 
shouldn’t enter into credit decisions.  Nor should it be a part of bosses’ calculus 
of promotion and demotion, however tempting that may be for data-driven 
managers.  Given the rise of attributions of health status via data entirely outside 
the “HIPAA zone,” without such restrictions on use of data, individuals will face 
wrenchingly difficult choices about whether to (a) learn more about their 
potential illness, while disclosing signals about themselves that could lead to 
future discrimination, or (b) stay uninformed, to avoid any potential 
discrimination. It is neither fair nor just to force that choice onto anyone. 
CONCLUSION 
There are multiple uses (and misuses) of health information compiled about 
patients, insureds, research subjects, physicians, hospitals, and populations. 
Privacy law has focused on assuring the confidentiality, security, and accuracy 
of health information. The post-HITECH landscape will increasingly balance 
these concerns with the goals of innovation, access, and cost-control. 
Advanced information technology has raised a number of new questions. 
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Beyond HIPAA and HITECH regulation, consumer protection law plays an 
important role in these fields. Patients are opting to personalize their health 
records with the help of cloud computing firms; what law governs this digital 
migration? There is increasing concern about the role of “incidental findings” in 
medical research; how will regulators and professional groups address them? 
When employers demand access to employee health records, in what ways can 
they use them to profile the employee? Should law limit the development of 
“medical reputations” about individuals, even if they are not based on protected 
health records? What are the proper tradeoffs between data privacy, security, 
portability, integrity, and accuracy? 
The networked health IT of cloud computing will raise all these questions 
and more as it attempts to bring the productivity gains characteristic of 
information industries to healthcare. But its systems need to be designed to 
protect the integrity and security of protected health information. 
The laws governing the management of healthcare information are 
extremely complex. Some of this complexity is necessary to the subject matter. 
However, it should not obscure the larger goals of health information law. This 
article has recommended some steps forward to assure that the interests of 
patients are front and center as health data collection enters a new and 
qualitatively different era of promise and peril. Both covered entities and their 
cloud service providers should be held to high standards by technologies of 
compliance as precise and persistent as their revenue-generating functions. If 
medical reputations are being created with data outside the bounds of present 
HIPAA and HITECH regulation, HHS needs to study these processes and 
acknowledge the limits of present models of privacy protection. Finally, 
regulation needs to assure that responsibility for protecting the privacy and 
security of data rests with the correct entity, be it a covered entity or business 
associate. The Omnibus HIPAA Rule released in January 2013 is a major step 
forward for health privacy, but more work remains to be done on the state and 
federal level to assure a regulatory framework up to the challenges to privacy 
and security generated by cloud computing technologies. 
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